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The Asian crisis brought much attention to banking sector systemic risk, understood as the 
potential macroeconomic consequences of the condition of the banking sector. In spite of 
growing interest,  there is no widely accepted robust measures of this  risk as it depends on a 
number of macroeconomic, microeconomic and institutional factors difficult to measure and 
compare internationally. This paper is an attempt at a comparative overview of banking sector 
systemic risk in six Central European countries concluding with some policy 
recommendations. The countries covered by the paper  are specific by the fact that in the early 
1990's they moved from a socialist to a market economy and the legacy of a socialist 
economy still has an important influence on the shape of their banking sectors.  
 
The paper consists of four sections. The first section describes the experience of the  six 
countries in dealing with the legacy of a socialist economy. The second section discusses the 
methodology used in the analysis of systemic bank risk and present Comparison Table with 
risk indicators and author's assessments. The third section describes in more detail the 
situation in the specific countries. The fourth and concluding section describes key challenges 
and policy recommendations. An Overview of the paper's findings is presented in the 
executive summary on pages 4-6. 
 . 
I gathered data for the analysis mostly in the summer and autumn of 1998 and only some 
information was updated later. Comparative analysis and risk assessment is presented as of 
end of 1997.  Latest developments are sometimes taken into account but not on a regular 
basis. 
 
This paper is the result of the author’s research visit to  the European I Department of the 
International Monetary Fund. I have benefited from discussions with the staff of the European 
I  and Monetary and Exchange Affairs Departments of the International Monetary Fund,  the 
Private and Financial Sector Development Department, Europe and Central Asia Region of 
the World Bank as well as Messrs.   Krzysztof Bledowski, Maciej Krzak and Slawomir 
Sikora, although I was not able to address all issues raised and incorporate all valuable 
suggestions. I would also like to express thanks to Mr. Krzysztof  Kluza for his help in the 
quantitative analysis and to  Ms. Teresa Pinski for editing the text. 
 
Responsibility for the paper, data, estimates and opinions as well as possible mistakes in it 





Past and present situation 
 
•  In the early 1990s, after jumping into a market economy and liberalizing their 
banking sectors, Central European countries underwent severe banking crises and 
spent significant budgetary resources to deal with them.  
•  The banking crises in Hungary and Poland have been resolved without system 
destabilization.  Now, the banking sectors in these two countries are relatively robust 
although small in relation to GDP. Measures taken to deal with banking crises in the 
remaining four countries were not effective.  
•  The banking crisis in Bulgaria ended with a major destabilization, dramatic 
downsizing of banking assets and  a deep recession.  
•  Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have yet to deal with their continuing 
banking crises which still constitute a danger for economic stability and 
development.  
 
Concise Comparison Table (Including developments until 1997)*/  
  Bulgaria   Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Romania  Slovakia 
Assessment of the 
Transition of the Industrial 
Sector 




14% 73%  21%  22%  13% 56% 
Soundness of Banking 
Practices 
B B  A  A  C B 
Banking Sector’s  Capital 
Deficiency 1997E/GDP 
-  8.8% 0%  2.2%  8% 9.6% 
Government Debt Adjusted 
by Banking Sector’s Capital 
Deficiency/GDP 
82% 22%  63%  49%  41% 38% 
Short 
Term 
1 4  1  1  5 5  Author’s Overall 
Assessment of 
Banking Sector 
Systemic Risk   
Medium 
Term 
3 4  2  2  5 5 
  */   Full table followed by explanatory notes is on page 16. 
  **/  A (best in the region), B (medium in the region) and C (weakest in the region). 
  ***/   The scale extends from 1 –very low risk to 5 – very high risk. 
 




•  Improvement in the shape of the banking sector in Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Romania as well as its future soundness in Bulgaria are dependent on changes in the 
microeconomy and progress in restructuring the industrial sector. On the other 
hand, a change in bank behavior is necessary for real restructuring of the industrial 
sector. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
•  In  Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria  a key issue  is how to ensure the soundness of 
banking sector in the medium and longer term in a likely period of growing   
monetization and dynamic expansion of domestic credit and when costs of potential 
financial instability will increase significantly. 
•  In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania a key issue is how to resolve  existing 
banking crises and avoid crisis repetitions. 
•  In the medium term, all six countries will have to deal with the potential  instability 
of  international capital flows and risk of currency crisis. 
•  In the very short term, all six countries will face  a risk of a systemic liquidity crunch 
that may be triggered by the year 2000 problem. 
 
Crisis resolution – dealing with bank capital deficiencies and bad debt restructuring 
(in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania) 
 
•  Banking sector problems may cause major economic and political destabilization 
unless they are dealt  with both decisively and in a way  that supports, not 
undermines, confidence. 
•  Troubled banks that will not be liquidated should be recapitalized either by new 
owners or more likely by the government. 
•  Rehabilitation should focus on changing bank  behavior. It should be connected with 
management changes and bank privatization. 
•  It would be advisable that bank rehabilitation  contributed to industrial sector 
restructuring. To this end, carving out bad claims and transferring  them to a 




•  The key aim of bank privatization should be to create the best conditions for  long 
term development,  soundness and efficiency of the privatized institution.  
•  In transition countries there is a lack of institutions that can become a reliable 
strategic investor. Fear that leading domestic banks will be taken over by foreign 
institutions and will lose their national character strongly affects privatization 
decisions in many countries. It often results either in delaying bank privatization for 
many years or privatization schemes that do not strengthen the bank. 
•  It is not unjustified  for a government  to seek privatization schemes that would 
ensure the autonomy and national character of  some banks. However, one should be 
aware of and try to minimize the risk that the institution privatized without a strong 
strategic investor will not be able to withstand competition and will cause problems 
in the future.  
 
Strengthening of regulatory and institutional framework 
 
•  Central European countries made  great progress in incorporating the Basle 
Committee’s  “Core Principles”  on banking regulations into their legal systems. 
Enforcement, however, is lacking not only because of the shortage of trained staff in 
banking supervision but it is also hindered by important flaws in regulations.  
•  The main flaws are  related to differences between domestic and international 
accounting and auditing standards including lack of overriding “substance over 
form” and “truth and fairness” rules as well as the frequent implementation of S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
regulations on a solo rather than a consolidated basis. These flaws also affect  the 
transparency of IAS reports published by banks.  
•  The usefulness of IAS auditor reports would increase if international standards on 
loan classification and provisioning requirements were implemented. 
•  Foreign indebtedness of commercial sector should be monitored and statistical data 
should be published  on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
•  Financial authorities should have the ability to introduce measures to discourage 
short-term capital inflows if the stock of such inflows  becomes significant in relation 
to foreign reserves.  
•  Currency risk exposure should be reported in audited financial reports published by 
all companies above a certain size. 
•  Guidance (indicative limits) on foreign currency exposures for companies should be 
established. 
•  Companies with short foreign exchange positions exceeding the regulatory limits   
should be banned from external  borrowing. 
•  The capacity  and efficiency of banking supervision could improve dramatically if 
public disclosure requirements are strengthened and responsibilities of auditors   
deepened and extended. 
 
Systemic risk of the  Year 2000 
 
•  Widespread anxiety among bank customers about the Year 2000 problem could be 
more damaging  than the technological issue itself. 
•  Banking supervision should eliminate banks  that have not addressed the Year 2000 
problem adequately or do not meet minimal solvency and liquidity standards.  
•  Banks that stay in the system should if needed receive quick liquidity support by the 
end of 1999 from the central bank to allow them to repay  deposits  and timely 
execute customer payment orders.   
•  Implementation of these steps to contain year 2000 systemic liquidity risk may be 
more problematic in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia where some major 
banks do not meet solvency and liquidity standards, and in Bulgaria where currency 
board arrangement limits the central bank's flexibility. 





Dealing with the legacy of a socialist economy 
 
The way countries have dealt with the legacy of a socialist economy  has an important if not 
decisive influence on the shape of banking sectors in Central European transition economies.  
 
1.1. Market structure  
 
Under the socialist economic system banking sectors in Central European countries were 
organized based on the Soviet  model with one state bank (monobank) responsible for both 
currency issuance and provision of  financing to the state enterprise sector. The monobank 
was supported by several specialized banks, mainly: a foreign trade bank and a savings bank.  
 
A two tier banking system was created in the last phase of the socialist system or after its end,  
by breaking up the monobank into a central bank and one or several commercial banks. At the 
beginning of transition, banking activity was deeply liberalized which preceded the building 
of an infrastructure of  prudential regulations and  banking supervision. A great number of 
new banks funded by domestic capital quickly emerged. In general, the record of these new 
start-ups has been weak and most ran into trouble because of  incompetence and/or connected 
lending and other fraudulent practices by shareholders and managers. As a result, start-up 
banks, although initially numerous, did not change the market structure substantially. A 
number of foreign banks also started up operations. Their greenfield operations – although 
some  were very successful –  did not significantly change the market structure either. 
 
Former state-owned banks (offspring of monobank or former specialized banks) still dominate 
banking sectors today.   A number of these banks have been privatized. Privatization was 
often only partial  with the state remaining the dominant shareholder. Only in Hungary most 
of  the banking sector (weighted by assets) is now privately controlled. State-controlled banks 
hold half of the banking assets in Poland and the majority of the banking assets  in the four 
remaining countries of  our survey.  
 
1.2. Bad debt problem in the early stage of transition 
 
In a socialist economy and in a situation of permanent shortage, enterprises either had no 
problems with selling their products and were able to set prices covering  all their costs or 
were given government subsidies. There was no phenomenon of bad debts and little need for 
banks to evaluate credit risk. 
 
As enterprises were exposed to market forces and output collapsed, a large proportion of bank 
loans became non-performing and  many of the major banks became technically insolvent. 
Central European countries recapitalized banks and restructured the bad debt portfolios of 
their banks in the early years of transition.  
 
In Poland,  a program of bank and enterprise financial restructuring as well as the prospect of 
bank privatization contained moral hazard and changed the behavior of banks, although 
privatization itself has been implemented slowly.   
Hungary learned from its experience with several recapitalizations of banks and ultimately 
changed bank behavior and bank/enterprise relations through privatization  with sale to 




In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia bank rehabilitation programs were 
simply bail-outs of banks and did not result in a change in bank behavior and  bank/ enterprise 
relations. Banks in these four countries, freed from old bad loans, remained under state 
control and were subjected to political influence in their lending policies and  extended  new 
bad loans. 
 
1.3.  Banks and real economy: specifics of early transition stage 
 
At the beginning of transformation former socialist economies were highly distorted. Since 
the end of central planning the real sector in transition economies underwent dramatic 
restructuring adjusting to the market. However, neither banks nor government agencies played 
a significant role in this process. Real sector restructuring was shaped by market forces. In the 
early stage of transition, bank credit and any government support were used across the region 
to finance the continuation of old activities and avoid or diminish the extent of difficult 
adjustments. Serious restructuring was triggered by the lack of funds to finance the 
continuation of previous activities
1/. 
 
Banks had little chance early on to direct credit in such a way as to contribute to real sector 
market-oriented growth. They could, however, contribute to market-oriented restructuring of 
the real sector by being  cautious in lending policies,  not wasting money and not  lending  
money to enterprises that were trying to avoid restructuring.  
 
In the most advanced transition economies such as Hungary and Poland, the initial transition 
collapse was followed by a 2-3 year period during which output increased while real credit to 
the economy declined or grew insignificantly
2/.  
 
1.4. Transition in the real sector: hypothetical grouping of countries 
  
From the point of view of the depth and mechanism of the restructuring of industrial 
companies, the six Central European countries covered by this study  may be grouped 
according to profiles defined by several indicators. Indicators such as: the relative change  of 
labor productivity in industry,  the change in industry’s share in GDP, extent of privatization, 
quality of privatization, share of classified loans and quality of macroeconomic policies over 
the transition period,  justify in my view distinguishing three groups of countries. The first 
group  composed of  Hungary and Poland   - countries where the industrial sector underwent 
the deepest restructuring – will be called “Steady Transition Countries”. The second group 
made up of  Czech Republic and Slovakia will be called “Slowdown Transition Countries” 
                                                           
1 / Only then did enterprises start to diminish excess employment and to sell or rent out unutilized pieces of 
equipment, buildings and other property. For instance, in Poland in the early stage of transition, the sale and 
renting out of  pieces of movable and  fixed assets by state enterprises constituted a key  element of  the 
privatization process in the Polish economy and  contributed significantly to the growth of a grassroots private 
sector. 
2/ The cumulative growth of real  GDP in Poland in 1993 and 1994 was  9,1%  while real credit increased by 
barely 1,3% and the unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points (from 13.6% to 16.5%). The 
cumulative growth of real  GDP in Hungary in the period 1994-1996 was  5.8%  while real credit dropped  by  
24% and unemployment rate decreased by 1.6 percentage points (from 12.1% to 10.5%) - see charts 8 and 9.  S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




Indicators such as  relative change in GDP over the transition period, credit to GDP ratio, 
extent of state enterprise autonomy under socialism system and extent  of  private  sector 
activity under socialism system add to the group profiles as shown in the table below. 
                                                           
3/ It should be noted that not all studies could support  such a grouping . A  research study by G. Pohl and others 
(1997), based on  financial and operating data from 1992 to 1995 for more than 6300 formerly state-owned 
industrial firms from seven countries  (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia), presents a number of indicators showing that industrial restructuring in the sample of Czech firms 
was actually much deeper than in other countries covered by the study. According to this  study (p. 16) the 
proportion of  industrial firms (weighted by employment) unable to service all their debts  in the Czech Republic 
in the period 1992-1995 declined dramatically from 29% to 6%, while   in other countries this share in 1995 was  
much higher: Hungary 16%, Slovakia 17%, Slovenia 19%, Poland 20%, Bulgaria 43% and Romania 60%. (G. 
Pohl, R. E. Aderson, S. Claessens and S. Djankov, “Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Evidence and Policy Options”, World Bank Technical Paper No 368, The World Bank Washington D.C. 
May 1997.) 
The above numbers are not, however,  easily compatible with Central Bank data showing that at the end of 1995 
as much as 36% bank loans in the Czech Republic (33% if excluding bank hospital Konsolidacni Banka) were in 
arrears for more than 30 days (classified loans) with the majority of these classified loans  being  in arrears for 
more than 180 days (doubtful and loss categories) – see: Standard&Poor’s, , “BankSystem Report. Czech 




Hypothetical Grouping of Countries 










in industry 1997 
versus 1989  
High increase 
 
Low or no increase  Low or no increase 
Industry Share in 
GDP 
Low  or steadily 
declining   
Slowdown or reversal 
of declining trend 
Slowdown or reversal 
of declining trend 
Extent of 
Privatization 
High (Hungary) or 
significant (Poland) 
Very high  Low 
Quality of 
Privatization 
High   Low  - 
Real GDP in 1998 in 
Relation to 1989 
Level 
Range 95-117%  Range 96-99%  Range 65-80% 
Credit to GDP ratio  Low  High  Declining to very low 
level 
Share of Classified 
Loans  
Steadily declining 
with 1997 level in the 
range of  8-10%,  
 
Stubbornly high with  
1997 level in the 
range of 33-35% 
 
Growing to exceed 
70% in 1995 
Macroeconomic 
Policies over the 
Transition Period  
Relatively stable and 
sound  
Relatively stable and 
sound  
 
Unsound and unstable 




Some None None 




Some Marginal  Marginal 
 
 
Change in labor productivity 
 
It is estimated that labor productivity in industry in 1997 relative to 1989 was 152% in 
Hungary, 142% in Poland,  114% in Czech Republic and around or below 100% in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia (see: chart 1). Thus this indicator distinguishes clearly a group of  
Steady Transition Countries from remaining countries.   
 
Industry share in GDP 
 
Socialist economies were over-industrialized with underdeveloped service sectors. In the early 
stage of transition, the share of industry in GDP dropped in all of the countries (see chart 2). 
However, in 1994-1996 this share was steadily decreasing only in Poland. An increase of this 
ratio in Hungary from  22.1% in 1994 to 23.5% in 1995 is not significant,  since it is much S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
lower than in all our countries including Poland. However, the containment or reversal of the 
declining trend in the four other countries can be interpreted as a reflection of a slowdown or 
even reversal  in real sector  restructuring under market conditions. This interpretation may be 
supported by a look at Belarus - a country where market economic reforms were reversed by 
administrative decisions and the share of industry in GDP increased in 1994-1996  by 4.5 
percentage points (from 30.9% to 35.3%). By contrast this share had been steadily dropping in 
Poland and fell in 1994-1996 by 5 percentage points (from 32.2% to 27.1%). In the same 
period in Romania and Czech Republic this share increased slightly (by 0.4 percentage points 
and by 0.2 percentage points respectively) and in Bulgaria and Slovakia it declined by less 
than 2 percentage points (1,9% and 0.6% respectively). The share in GDP in all of these four 
countries was higher than in Hungary and Poland. 
. 
This indicator also distinguishes Hungary and Poland from the remaining countries.  
  
Extent and quality of privatization 
 
The extent of privatization is the highest in Slowdown Transition Countries (Czech Republic 
and Slovakia). However, the quality of privatization in these countries is regarded to be low as 
a result of the domination of voucher privatization, little participation of strategic investors, 
strong influence of partly privatized and still state controlled banks and their investment 
funds, low transparency and weak protection of minority shareholders rights. In comparison, 
the formal extent of privatization in Steady Transition Countries is either  comparable 
(Hungary) or lower (Poland), however the quality of privatization is regarded to be much 
better. 
 
Suspended Transition Countries (Bulgaria and Romania) are distinguished by the lower extent 
of privatization than in the other countries (see chart 3). 
 
Real GDP in 1998 in relation to 1989 level 
 
Real GDP in 1998 relative to 1989 was 117% in Poland (a Steady Transition Country),  96-
99% in the  Slowdown Transition Countries  and  65-80% in the Suspended Transition 
Countries. However, Hungary (the second of the Steady Transition Countries) is an anomaly 
with a 95% ratio which is lower than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and  closer to 
Romania than Poland (see: chart 4).  
 
Credit to GDP ratio 
 
This ratio clearly distinguishes three groups of countries. It is interesting that Steady 
Transition Countries have low credit to GDP ratios at about 21-22%. This ratio had been 
declining since 1991 and started to increase only in 1996 or 1997.  Slowdown Transition 
Countries have much higher credit to GDP ratios in the range of 56-73%.  Suspended 
Transition Countries have ratios that fluctuated and have declined to a very low level of 13-
14% in 1997 (see: chart 5). 
  
Share of classified loans 
 
"Classified loans" are loans classified to all quality categories below "standard" . Number of 
days in arrears is the dominant criterion of loan classification in Central European Countries. 
Classified loans encompass loans overdue for more than 30 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Poland, and Slovakia; , - loans overdue for 7 or more days in Romania and any overdue loans 
in Bulgaria.  
 
Data on classified loans demonstrate the very distinctive features of the three groups as 
described  in the table “Hypothetical Grouping of Countries” above. 
 
Share of Classified Loans
4/ 
Country 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Bulgaria     70%    15-20% 
Czech Republic   40%  36.1%  34.4%  33.9% 
Hungary  29.8% 21.3% 16.1% 12.9%  8.6% 
Poland  31%  28.5% 20.9% 12.7% 10.1% 
Romania   64.3%  83.2%  88.9%  




Banking sector systemic risk comparison 
 
2.1. Notions of a banking crisis and banking sector systemic risk  
 
Banking crisis is defined here as a situation where the high share of non performing assets  in 
the banking system threatens the liquidity or solvency  of a significant part of the banking 
sector.  
 
A banking crisis affects the economy in various ways. It undermines overall confidence in the 
economy and causes  misallocation of resources. It  may  result in a major banking 
destabilization when major banks lose liquidity and/or there is a bank panic resulting in 
downsizing of the banking sector's balance sheet. Such destabilization  is likely to be 
connected with a drop in GDP as in Bulgaria in 1996 and 1997. Even if a one-off 
destabilization is avoided, an unresolved banking crisis undermining  confidence in banks, 
threatening their  liquidity may contribute to the systematic erosion of  banking balance sheet 
as it happened in Romania. Prolonged banking crisis even if it neither destabilizes nor erodes 
banking sector is likely to ultimately have a deep negative impact on economic growth as in 
the Czech Republic and Japan. If a banking crisis  is dealt with both decisively and in a way  
                                                           
4/  Bulgaria:  International Monetary Fund, “Bulgaria: Recent Economic Developments and Statistical 
Appendix”, April 1999 (IMF Staff Country Report N0 99/26). 
Czech Republic: Data for 1995-1997 from Standard & Poor’s, “Bank System Report. Czech Republic”, July 
1998; data for 1994 estimated based on Moody’s Investor Service, “Banking System Outlook. Czech Republic”, 
December 1997. 
Hungary: Standard & Poor’s, “Bank System Report. Hungary”, July 1998.  
Poland: Narodowy Bank Polski, Generalny Inspektorat Nadzoru Bankowego, “Sytuacja Finansowa Banków w 
1997r. Synteza”, Warszawa, marzec 1998 (National Bank of Poland, General Inspectorate of Banking 
Supervision,  Financial Situation of Banks in 1997,  Warsaw , March 1998) – data for 1993- 1995 do not cover 
cooperative banks having 5-7% share in sector’s loans.   
Romania: Moody’s Investor Service, “Banking System Outlook. Romania”, February 1998. 
Slovakia: Moody’s Investor Service, “Banking System Outlook. Slovakia”, June 1998 – Share of classified 
claims including loans and accounts with other banks. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
that supports confidence, the disruptive impact on economic growth may be minimized. The 
recapitalization of banks, however, usually requires significant budgetary resources.  
 
Banking sector systemic  risk  can be defined as the estimated future macroeconomic impact 
of banking sector problems weighted by the probability of  different variants of future events.  
 
2.2. Other attempts of an international comparison of   banking sector  systemic risk  
 
The Asian crisis brought much more attention to banking sector systemic risk and resulted in 






Standard & Poor’s (S&P) assumes that in a banking crisis  bad loans in the banking sector 
constitute contingent liability of the government  and a proxy for direct and indirect fiscal 
costs. S&P  classifies banking systems of selected countries into five risk categories.   
Rankings “reflect Standard&Poor’s appraisal of factors such as financial sector management 
and regulation, the pace of change in the regulatory  and  operation environment, the degree 
of macroeconomic volatility, and the extent of moral hazard and information deficiencies 
within the country”
6/.  Each category is described by percentage range of   domestic credit to 
non-government (private sector and non financial public enterprises), that may become 
problematic in a period of reasonably worst-case economic slowdown or recession. This 
percentage is estimated taking into account experience from banking crises in the world in 
1980s and 1990s.  
 
S&P risk category 
Rank  Percentage of   domestic credit to non-
government (private sector and non 
financial public enterprises), that may 
become problematic in a bad economic 
downturn  
Countries 
1  5%-15%  
 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Sweden, UK, USA 
2  10%-20%  Chile, Finland, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan 
3  15%-30%  Argentina, Columbia, Hungary, Israel, 
Korea,  Malaysia, Panama, Philippines, 
Poland, Slovenia, Uruguay 
4  25%-40%  Brazil,  Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, 
Indonesia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,   
Slovakia, Thailand 
5  35%-60%  China, India, Latvia, Mexico, Pakistan, 




                                                           
5/  Standard & Poor’s Sovereign Ratings Service, ”Financial System Stress and Sovereign Credit Risk”, 
December 1997. 




If  the above  estimation of  the percentage of problem loans for a given country is multiplied 
by non-government credit to GDP ratio, one  receives an estimation of  direct and indirect 
fiscal costs (as percentage of GDP) to support banking sector in a worse case situation. 
 
Calculation of Worst Case Government Contingent Liability to Support  Banking Sector’s/GDP 
(Based on S&P risk categorization)* 
 Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland  Romania  Slovakia 
Percentage of   Credit  to 
Become Problematic in a Worst 
Case Scenario 
(S&P risk categorization) 
25% - 40%  15% - 30% 15% -  30%  35% - 60%  25% - 40%
Credit to Non Government /GDP 
1997 
73% 21% 22%  13% 56% 
Worst Case Government 
Contingent Liability to 
Support  Banking 
Sector’s/GDP 
18% - 29%  3% - 6%  3% - 7%  5% - 8%  14% - 22%
*/ Bulgaria is not included in S&P’s risk classification. 
 
J.P. Morgan’s  focus on loan growth and economy’s financial  leverage
7/ 
 
Looking at systemic banking risk in emerging economies J.P. Morgan focused on two   
indicators:  
1)  private sector credit growth relative to GDP growth 
2)  overall  leverage of the economy (or loan penetration) expressed as credit to non-
government to GDP ratio.  
 
„Our main conclusion is that excessive rates of loan growth in already leveraged economies 
have created high risk situations, especially in markets that have enjoyed long, sustained 
periods of prosperity. During such times , banks – in both developed and emerging economies 
– often become complacent, with the result that growth objectives become paramount, credit 
standards tend to become too lax, and loans are frequently mispriced , underestimating the 
risk of the borrower or project.”
8/ 
 
J.P. Morgan notes that in an economy with very low level of financial  leverage, which is 
deepening, loan growth rate should be naturally much higher than GDP growth. However, as 
loan penetration increases loan growth should gradually decrease relative to GDP growth. 
“Beyond the point at which financial leverage exceeds 100% of GDP, we should expect 
growth in loans roughly approximate the growth of nominal GDP”
9/. 
 
J.P. Morgan draws a “hypothetical  curve”  which can be interpreted as  an upper limit above 
which credit growth rate is excessive for a given level of financial leverage of the economy. 
 
J.P. Morgan analyzes 29 emerging markets for the period 1990-1996. The most risky were 
Asian economies: Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea and to a lesser extent Philippines. The 
                                                           
7 / J.P. Morgan, “Bank sector risks to emerging economies”, Special Corporate Study – Financial Institutions, 
Hong Kong, London and New York November 7, 1997. 
8 / Op. cit. 
9 / Op. cit. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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first four of these countries represent a combination of high leverage (loans to GDP ratio in 
the range 130%-150%) and high credit growth. Philippines has lower leverage (below 60%) 
but its credit growth  is  excessive for its leverage level.  
 
Five central European countries included in the analysis Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia are in a safe range with credit growth rates much below upper limits 
set by the hypothetical curve. 
 
“Surprisingly, our analysis shows that banking systems in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe are much less vulnerable than those in East Asia. Even in Brazil and Russia, 
countries of much current concern, the economies have lower  levels of exposure to banking 
system problems that in almost all east Asian countries. This does not mean that a banking 
crisis is unlikely outside Asia, but rather that severity of a potential crisis is lower and, most 
importantly, the spillover effect on the rest of the economy is likely to be less.”
10/  
 
Applicability of S&P’s and J.P. Morgan's approaches 
 
In this paper I focus on a smaller number of countries than the studies by S&P’s and J.P.  
Morgan.  Our group of six Central European countries is specific in the fact that in the early 
1990s they moved from a socialist to a market economy. An important element  of this   
analysis is that  half of these countries are in the midst of banking crises and a key task is to 
assess their  extent, possible consequences and remedies. The approaches taken by S&P’s and 
J.P. Morgan have only limited  applicability here. 
 
A common element of my analysis and the approaches of S&P’s and J.P. Morgan is that 
financial leverage of the economy  is a key factor in evaluating banking sector systemic risk. 
The potential fiscal cost of banking sector problems  ceteris paribus depends on the sector's 
relative size. One  may also expect that macroeconomic consequences of a major banking 
system destabilization are  deeper when the economy is more  leveraged. However, in 1996-
1997 Bulgaria proved that a banking system destabilization in an economy with modest   
financial  leverage may cause a very sharp drop in output. 
 
J.P. Morgan's focus on loan growth in relation to the economy's financial leverage has  limited 
applicability to explain the current shape of banking sectors in our six countries, since this 
shape is not a result of excessive credit growth in the last several years but rather the result of  
the unsolved legacy of the socialist system. J.P. Morgan's approach is likely to be more 
relevant to assess banking sector risk in Central European countries in the future, once the 
process of deepening of their economies takes on momentum. 
 
Although I do not rely on S&P's of risk categories, I use a somewhat similar categorization of  
soundness of  banking practices which play a less central role in my analysis. 
 
2.3. Comparison table and  methodology 
 
The Comparison Table below presents a summary of  banking sector systemic risk evaluation 
in the six countries. The table is followed by explanatory notes.  
 
 
                                                           





Comparison Table  
  Bulgaria   Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Romania  Slovakia 
Assessment of the Transition 
of Industrial Sector 
Suspended Slowdown  Steady    Steady Suspended Slowdown 
Non Government Credit/GDP 
(1997) 
14% 73%  21%  22%  13% 56% 
Soundness of Banking 
Practices 
B B  A  A  C B 
Banking Sector’s  Capital 
Deficiency 1997E/GDP 
-  8.8% 0%  2.2%  8%  9.6% 
Banking Sector’s  Capital 
Deficiency 1997E/M2 
- 13%  0%  5%  44%  15% 
Government Debt Adjusted by 
Banking Sector’s Capital 
Deficiency/GDP (1997) 
104% 22% 63%  49% 41%  38% 
Non government 
credit/deposits 1997 
79% 123%  69% 
 
75% 85%  102% 
Short 
Term 
1 4  1  1  5 5  Author’s Overall 
Assessment of 
Banking Sector 
Systemic Risk   
Medium 
Term 




a)  Assessment of the Transition of the Industrial Sector until 1997 
 
Hypothetical grouping of countries is described in paragraph 1.4. 
 
b)  Non Government Credit/GDP (1997) 
 
Non Government Credit is credit to private sector and non-financial public enterprises. Data are from 
tables with main macroeconomic indicators (enclosed in annexes)  
 
c)  Soundness of Banking Practices 
 
Based on opinions of external analysts (rating agencies and investment banks) and my own 
observations  and discussions with experts I grouped  our six countries into three categories 
ranked according to the relative Soundness of Banking Practices. Category A (best in the 
region) is assigned to Hungary and Poland. Category B (medium in the region) is assigned to 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Category C (weakest in the region) is assigned to 
Romania.  
 
d)  Banking Sector’s  Capital Deficiency  
 
Banking sector capital deficiency is an assessment  of  additional capital that should be 
injected into the banking sector in order to create adequate provisions against loan losses and  
increase the sector’s  capital to the adequate level. Capital deficiency in 1997 is calculated in 
the following steps: 
 




Comment. Number of days in arrears is the dominant criterion of loan classification in 
Central European Countries. "Classified loans" are loans classified to all quality 
categories below "standard". In particular countries, classified loans are grouped into 3 
or 4 categories depending on the number of days in arrears. Criteria to distinguish 
specific classified categories differ among countries more than criterion to distinguish the 
standard loans from classified loans. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia classified loans encompass loans overdue for more than 30 days, and in 
Romania - loans overdue for 7 or more days. Thus the  definition of classified loans is 
pretty uniform in our group of six countries. Relying on official data on classified loans is, 
however, sensitive to misrepresentation of actual performance of loans in bank reports to 
supervisory authorities and to “evergreening” phenomenon.   It is difficult to assess such 
risk. Hiding significant amounts of problem loans through “evergreening” is difficult 
when real interest rates are high and the credit portfolio doesn’t grow fast. Looking at the 
dynamic of credit to GDP (see chart 7) one can say that there was significant potential 
room for “evergreening” in Slovakia  in 1995-1997, and to a much smaller extent in  the 
Czech Republic and Poland  and very  little room  in Hungary
11// and Romania. However, 
I  know neither of indicators nor anecdotal evidence suggesting  that misrepresentation of 
actual performance of loans and  “evergreening” dramatically change the picture in our 
group of countries. 
 
2)  To calculate required provision level I assume that a minimum adequate amount of 
provisions is 60% of  gross value of classified loans (i.e. loans in arrears for more that 30 
days) regardless of reported collateral value. 
  
Comment.  In any banking system a provision level is adequate if it is rational to expect 
that the gap between the value of problem loans and the value of provisions will  be 
covered by future payments from the debtors and/or by recovery of collateral. Assuming 
uniform 60% required provision to classified loans ratio I disregard potential differences 
in probability of repayment and recovery. This approach may actually lead to an 
underestimation of provision needs in countries such as Czech Republic where a high 
proportion of classified loans are loans in the loss category overdue for a couple of years 
and still carried on books because of  very restrained write-off regulations. It is justified 
to require a higher provision ratio for such loans, taking into account the poor  record of  
collateral recovery and  limited liquidity of the property market in transition economies. 
On the other hand uniform 60% required provision ratio is likely to overestimate 
provision needs in a country such as Hungary where most of classified loans are just 
loans “under observation” with relatively  high probability of repayment. However, not 
having  enough reliable data on the structure of classified loans in all six countries I think 
it is better to apply a uniform 60% required provision ratio for all countries. 
 
3)  I compare required provision level with actual reported level to calculate provision gap 
                                                           
11 / “Evergreening” probably existed on a large scale in Postabank – a Hungarian bank that distinguished itself in 
the sector with very high credit growth and ultimately ran into troubles – see: Postabank case and quality of 
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4)  I take officially reported capital base of commercial bank sector and deduct provision gap 
and other justified deductions from reported capital base  to calculate actual capital base 
5)  To calculate required capital base of commercial bank sector I assume that the minimum  
Basle  capital adequacy ratio (capital to risk weighted exposures ratio) is 12%
12/. In cases 
where there is an insufficient base for calculating capital adequacy, I take capital to non 
weighted assets ratio of 8% as a proxy for the 12% Basle capital adequacy.  
6)  I  compare the required capital base with the actual capital base to calculate the sector’s 
capital deficiency. 
 
The value of  the banking sector’s capital deficiency is shown in relation to GDP and M2.  
 
 
e)  Government Debt Adjusted by Banking Sector’s Capital Deficiency /GDP 
 
This indicator is important to judge government fiscal flexibility to deal with the banking 
sector capital deficiency. 
 
f)  Non government credit/deposits 1997 
 
This indicator is important to judge structural liquidity of the banking sector.  
 
g)  Overall Assessment of Banking Sector Systemic Risk 
 
Banking Sector Systemic Risk could be defined as the estimated future macroeconomic impact of 
banking sector problems weighted by the probability of  different variants of future events. 
The score of  Banking Sector Systemic Risk constitutes a non mathematical  relative 
assessment of a country’s banking sector systemic risk against the background of other 
countries in the region,  according to the following scale:    
      
  1 – very low risk 
  2 – low risk 
  3 – significant risk 
  4 – high risk 














                                                           
12 /  12% capital adequacy was assumed as minimum level in the Polish bank and enterprise financial 
restructuring program in 1993. Later 12% level was recommended  by Basle Committee to transition economies. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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Following the crisis of 1996 and the dramatic downsizing of banking assets, the risk of 
destabilization in the short term is very low. In the medium term, risk is significant with risk 
factors being: 
•  State ownership control over banking and danger of delaying privatization.  
•  Still weak institutional framework and bank management skills 
•  Government  pressure on banks to increase lending “to support economic growth” 
•  High expense level and relative attractiveness of loans versus government securities 
fueling credit growth 
•  Conversion of State Savings Bank into commercial bank 
•  Danger of slowdown or reversal of  reforms started in 1997. 
 
The score of  the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Bulgaria is 1 (very low risk) for 
the short term and 3 (significant) for the medium term.  
 
Banking crisis 1996 
 
Bulgaria underwent a dramatic banking  crisis in 1996.  The crisis had its roots in bad loans 
made during 1991-1995 as a result of appalling credit policies. At the end of 1995,  70% of 
bank loans were classified  and  the banking system as a whole had negative net worth in the 
order of  10% of GDP. 
 
  As it often happens, it took some time until the insolvency of the banking system was 
reflected in liquidity problems. Serious liquidity problems appeared in the second half of 1994 
and in 1995 in some big state and  private banks. Significant refinancing from the central bank 
(Bulgarian National Bank – BNB) and from the State Savings Bank (SBB) was necessary to 
keep the system afloat.  
 
Confidence in the banking system declined through 1995 and broke down completely in 1996 
with a  run on banks. In the first phase of the crisis the central bank (BNB) was providing 
liquidity to troubled banks to keep them afloat. Between September 1995 and May  1996, 
BNB injected in the system an equivalent of 5.8% of GDP.   
 
In the midst of the crisis, in May 1996, special measures were introduced in a rush to allow 
amore  comprehensive dealing with the problem. Amendments to the banking law allowed the 
BNB to place a group of five banks under conservatorship and trigger bankruptcy 
proceedings.  A depositor protection scheme was also established providing full protection for 
household deposits and 50% coverage for enterprise deposits. In addition a recapitalization 
scheme for seven state owned banks was implemented. 
 
May 1996  actions were not sufficient to contain the crisis. Between May 1996 and September 
1996 the BNB had to further inject the equivalent of 2% of GDP. In September 1996 the BNB 
initiated concervatorship and bankruptcy for another 9 banks including three state-owned 
banks. Additional measures to close banks and recapitalize the weakest surviving state-owned 
bank were taken in the first half of 1997.  
 
 
Out of 39 banks (10 state-owned and 29 privately owned) existing in early 1996, 18 banks, 
accounting for 32% of total deposits,  collapsed and  were closed by June 1997.  Closures 
included 4 state-owned banks while the remaining 6 state-owned banks survived, receiving 




The run on banks in Bulgaria triggered  a deep macroeconomic crisis with long lasting 
consequences. Inflation soared from 33% in 1995 to  2040% in 12 months ending March 
1997. The cumulative drop of real GDP in 1996 and 1997 amounted to 18%. Broad  money  
to GDP declined to one third of the pre-crisis level:  from 70% in December 1994 and 60% in 
December  1995 to 23% in  June  1997. The domestic currency money  to GDP ratio declined 
even  more: from 47% in December 1994 and 44% in December 1995 to 8% in March  1997 
and 9% in June 1997.  
 
An IMF supported program that included the introduction of a currency board in July 1997 
stabilized the economy.  In 1998 inflation dropped to 1% and real GDP  grew by 3.5%.  The 
broad money to GDP ratio recovered only slightly to   30% (i.e. less than half of 1994 level) 
in December 1998. The domestic  currency money to GDP ratio recovered to 18.% of GDP 
(i.e. 40% of  1994 level) in December 1998. 
 
Current situation of the banking sector 
The banking sector was downsized. The deposits  to GDP ratio declined from   55% in 1994 
to 50% in 1995, 39% in 1996 and  then dropped to 18% (see: chart 6). Non-government credit 
dropped respectively from 44% of GDP in 1994 to 34% in 1995, 35% in 1996 and 14% in 
1997 (see: chart 5). 
 In mid-1998 banks – with the exception of a few smaller institutions - were reported   to be 
solvent and liquid. However, auditor reports according to International Accounting  Standards 
(IAS) were not available. 
The reported solvency and liquidity of the system were restored as a result of:  
•  elimination of a number of insolvent banks 
•  recapitalization of state-owned banks 
•  huge foreign exchange gains of  banks (having mostly long foreign currency positions in 
the time of dramatic depreciation of local currency) 
•  shift in bank portfolios from credits to  liquid  assets, as banks became credit risk averse. 
 
In the short term, it seems that there is no major risk of destabilization of the banking sector in 
Bulgaria. The prospect for the medium term is, however, unclear because of  the existence of 
several risk factors. The institutional framework as well as bank management skills are still 
weak. Banks are state controlled and privatization prospects are uncertain.  Bank lending to 
the enterprise sector may  grow fast under political pressure from the government and because 
of banks’ need for higher income in order to cover high general expenses. There is therefore a 
considerable risk that in the medium term Bulgarian banks may again become overburdened 
by bad debt. Significant risk is also connected with the transformation of the State Savings 
Bank into a commercial bank. 
   
Institutional framework 
 
Although major legal and regulatory improvements took place in 1997 and 1998,  the 






Banking  sector skills, including  capacity to manage risk under market conditions, proved to 
be inadequate in the past and will need time to achieve a satisfactory  level.  
 
State control and privatization prospects 
 
At the end of 1998 five state and municipally controlled banks accounted for about 60% of  
sector’s assets. Three of these banks were in the privatization pipeline and two others under 
restructuring to prepare them for privatization.  
 
Political pressure to increase lending 
 
In 1998 the authorities have expressed their frustration with the reluctance of banks to extend 
new credit in support of economic growth and were reported to  consider, as a remedy,   
relaxing prudential regulations especially those relating to collateral requirements and large 
loan exposure.  
 
The belief that more bank credit is necessary to support economic growth is also expressed by 
external observers such as a leading US investment bank Goldman Sachs 
13/.  I believe, 
however, that a call  for more bank lending in order to support economic growth is misplaced 
in the current situation of the Bulgarian economy. Bulgaria is a case of suspended transition 
where, after bold market reforms at the beginning of transition  further reforms were delayed 
and the old enterprise base was kept in existence through accommodating fiscal and monetary 
policies as well as loans from state-owned banks. As a result,  restructuring of the economy 
under market conditions has been suspended which  is also reflected in the dynamics of the 
share of industry in GDP. This share in Bulgaria was 32.7% in 1993 which was almost the 
same as in Poland (32.9 percent). In the following three years, until 1996,  this share declined 
in Poland by 5.8 percentage points (to 27.1 percent) while in Bulgaria it decreased  by only 
1.1 percentage point  ( to 31.6 percent).(See: graph 2). 
 
Experience in transition economies shows that banks can best contribute to real sector 
development if they are cautious in their lending policies as not to waste money and if they do 
not finance enterprises that should restructure. With prudent macroeconomic policies and the 
necessary institutional and structural reforms, real GDP in Bulgaria may grow for the next 
two or three years without increase of  real credit to the economy, as it happened in Poland in 
1993-1994 or in Hungary in 1994-1996 (see: Section 1.3. Banks and real economy: specifics 
of early transition stage). Bulgarian banks also need to upgrade their credit risk management. 
Time is also needed to strengthen regulations as well as supervisory framework and skills. 
Pressure  on banks to support economic growth through more lending may undermine   
macroeconomic policies, slow down structural changes and result in the renewal of problems 
in the banking sector. 
 
Non-sustainability of income sources versus high expense level 
                                                           
13 / „A risk to economic growth is the insufficient lending to the real sector. Although credit growth has started to 
turn positive in real terms in the second quarter, current credit growth will not allow for sustainable economic 
growth.”, Goldman Sachs, “Emerging Market Economic Quarterly”,  Volume 2, Issue 2,  July 1998, Regional 




The banking sector was profitable in 1997 because of windfall profits from foreign exchange 
gains while net interest earnings were too low to cover operational expenses. This highlights 
the inefficiency of the system which may result in future losses and depletion of capital or in 
undertaking more risk in hope of  higher revenues. 
 
 
High credit growth 
 
As a result of the high liquidity of the banking sector and prudent fiscal stance, yields on 
treasury bills diminished which increased the relative attractiveness of  loans.  Search for 
income sources resulted in high credit growth starting in the second half of 1997.  In the first 
three quarters of  1998 loans to non-financial sector increased by about 18% in real terms with 
annualized rate of growth of about 24%.  
 
State Savings Bank 
 
 The State Savings Bank (SBB) is in the process of  transformation from a specialized savings 
institution into a commercial bank. The transition period is to last another two years until the 
state’s full deposit guarantee is lifted. SBB accounted for about 12% of banking sector assets 
and for 37% of local currency deposits at the end of 1997. In the past, SBB’s  assets were held 
in government  securities and  deposits in other banks. Since the banking crisis of 1996 
interbank deposits have been greatly reduced. SBB started to build  rapidly a portfolio of 
loans (mostly consumer) in search for higher revenues fuelled by the necessity to cover a high 
expense base.  Since end-December 1996 to end-September 1998  SBB’s loan to assets ratio  
has grown from a negligible 3% to 54% - twice as high as the sector average of 27%.  
 
The dynamic transformation of a state savings institution into a commercial bank and high 
credit growth is very risky as the experience of many countries has demonstrated
14/ and is 
likely to result in the deterioration of loan portfolios.  
 
3.2. Czech Republic 
 
•  With a bank deposits to GDP ratio of 60%  and credit to non-government to GDP ratio of 
73%, banking sector penetration in the Czech Republic is the highest among transition 
economies. High financial leverage  makes the Czech economy very exposed to banking 
system risk. 
•  Share of non-performing loans is  stubbornly high and there is a significant  provision  
gap.  
•  Non-government credit to deposit ratio of 123% shows structural liquidity imbalance of 
the banking sector. 
•  However, the government  is seen to stand behind major banks and has enough fiscal 
flexibility to  support the banks to the necessary extent.  
•  The origins of banking sector problems can be found in the lack of comprehensive 
privatization and industrial  restructuring as well as the dominance in  both the banking 
                                                           
14 / See: S. Kawalec, “Reshaping Former Savings Banks: Options and Risks”, Paper for the Policy Seminar  “On 
selected Topics in Banking System Development and Reform”, Organized by the World Bank in association  with 
the National Bank of Ukraine and the Association of Ukrainian Banks, Puscha Ozernaya, Kiev, Ukraine, 
November 1-3, 1996. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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sector and the economy of  big state controlled banks having strong direct and indirect 
cross-ownership ties with industrial  enterprises. These factors cannot be dealt with 
quickly although they have been diagnosed and  are being addressed by the authorities. 
 
The score of the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Czech Republic is 4 (high risk) for 
both the short and medium  term. 
 
Restructuring of pre-1991 debt, subsequent government intervention to support banks 
 
In  1991-1997, the Czechoslovak and subsequently Czech governments spent about US$ 4.7 
billion - equivalent of about 12%  of  GDP of  Czech Republic in 1994 - to restructure  banks 
that are now in the Czech Republic. More than 50% of this amount or about US$ 2.9 billion 
was provided in 1991 and 1992 when the newly created bank hospital Konsolidacni Banka 
took over pre-1991 bad debts. About US$ 1.1 billion was spent in subsequent years on the 
consolidation program of small banks while the resolution of Agrobanka cost about US$ 0.6 
billion 
15/.   
 
Formal privatization of major banks 
 
The three biggest banks (Komercni, Ceska Sporitelna and Investicni ) were officially 
privatized in 1992 by the exchange of more than 50% of their shares for privatization 
coupons. The government retained a controlling stake of 40-45% in the banks. At the same 
time, the banks were actively participating in the coupon privatization of companies, 
establishing the largest investment funds by amassing  privatization coupons. Through these 
funds the banks became indirect holders of their own shares and have a significant stake in 
companies that are also their customers 
16/.   
 
Reemergence of bad debt problem 
 
As opposed to the developments in Hungary and Poland where following government 
sponsored restructuring of old debts  the quality of bank loan portfolios improved 
significantly over time, in Czech commercial banks  room created by  transferring old bad 
debts  to the bank hospital was soon filled by  new bad loans. 
 
In  1997,  credits in arrears for more than 30 days (classified credit) accounted for  34% of 
total credit portfolio of the Czech banking sector (27% if excluding bank hospital 
Konsolidacni Banka) while this share was 8.6% in Hungary and 10.1% in Poland 
17/.  
 
Origins of the problems 
 
The opinion prevailing now among observers is that Czech bank problems are related to  the 
lack of far-reaching privatization and industrial  restructuring as well as the dominance in  
both the banking sector and the economy of  big state controlled banks having strong direct 
and indirect cross-ownership ties with industrial  enterprises. 
                                                           
15 / Standard & Poor’s, “BankSystem Report. Czech Republic”, July 1998, p.15.   
16 / see: A. Capek  (Institute of Economics, Czech National Bank), “Privatization of Banks  and their Credit 
Policy during the Transition in the Czech Republic”, CASE – Center for Social & Economic Research, Warsaw 
1995. 




Banks,  painlessly freed from old bad loans, started to  lend again to the same companies 
without pressing strongly enough for their restructuring and extended  loans to support small 
privatization. It is estimated  that the problem loans that are now in the commercial bank 
portfolios were  mostly extended in the early years of transformation. About 60% of  problem 
loans are exposures to industrial companies. As much as 30-35% of  problem loans are credits 
to trade, catering and accommodation sectors,  extended in 1991-1993, likely with some 
political pressure on state-owned banks to support the small-scale privatization program 
18/. 
New (post 1990) loans were extended with little evaluation of the repayment ability of 
borrowers. Instead they were secured with collateral on real property with significant book 
value but negligible, if any, market value.  
 
Several factors contributed to the  behavior of bank managers: 
•  state control over banks, lack of further privatization prospects (until late 1997) and the 
feeling that the government – in spite of liberal free market rhetoric – is interested in 
keeping big troubled companies afloat and avoiding painful redundancies. 
•  banks’ equity interests  in major companies and connected lending 
•  moral hazard created by repeated government bail-out operations  
•  weak regulations and supervision  that allowed banks to report  that non-performing and 
lowly provisioned loans are secured by collateral. At least until  the end of 1997 both the 
banks and the supervisory authority, the Czech National Bank, pretended that classified 
loans are adequately provisioned
19/.   
•  reliance on hugely overstated collateral value additionally diminished banks’ eagerness to 
undertake a more active approach to bad debtors since actions such as seizure and trying  
to realize  collateral or filing for bankruptcy would have unveiled that provisions are too 
low and must be increased. 
 
Provision gap  
 
Provisions against bad debts created by Czech banks in 1997 amounted to 33% of  the gross 
value of classified loans or to 48% of  their  risk weighted classification
20/. The provision gap 
(short of 60% coverage) in Czech banks in September 1997 amounted to 27% of the total 




Reported capital adequacy 
 
Apart from the above estimation of the provision gap, the average capital adequacy level 
reported by the Czech banking sector  is low given the risk faced by a transition economy. 
The sector’s reported capital adequacy was 10.5% in 1997. An increase of the sector’s capital 
adequacy by 1.5 percentage point to 12% would require a capital injection of about 1.5% of 
GDP (approximately USD 750 million).   
 
                                                           
18 / See:  Merrill Lynch, ”Czech Banks: Weighted Down by Debt”, (by D. Vergot Holle and S. Pettyfer),  28 
February 1997, p.30-33.  
19 / See: Moody’s  Investor Service “Banking System Outlook. Czech Republic” December 1997, p.13. 
20 /  Weighted 20% for substandard, 50% for doubtful  and  100% for loss category.  
21 / See: comment to point 2) of the explanatory note on  the calculation of Banking Sector Capital Deficiency 
(page 17). S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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Total capital deficiency 
 
Total capital deficiency to fill the provision gap and to increase the sector’s  capital adequacy 
to a safe level of 12% is about 9% of GDP or US$ 4 billion in September 1997. 
 
Vulnerability to economic downturn 
 
High credit to GDP ratio makes the Czech banking system very vulnerable to an economic 
downturn. The financial situation of the enterprise sector and the quality of bank loan 
portfolios are  likely to  deteriorate as a result of the recession in 1998.  
 
Government commitment and ability to support the banking sector 
 
There were numerous bank failures in the Czech Republic although all except for Agrobanka 
involved small banks. Treatments of all these failures supported the perception  that the 
government  stands firmly behind  the banking sector. This government attitude creates a 
moral hazard but shows confidence in the banks. Rating agencies assume a very strong 




The Czech government is seen to have enough fiscal flexibility to  support the banks to the 
necessary extent because of its low 13% ratio of general government debt to  GDP and 
modest  44% ratio of total economy foreign debt to GDP. Among our six Central European 
countries, the Czech Republic has the highest rating from major rating agencies, based on its 
steady macroeconomic policy stance
23/. 
 
Addressing the problems 
 
Following the May 1997 currency crisis, the authorities started to address weaknesses in the 
capital market and banking regulations more vigorously in order to improve transparency. 
More stringent loan classifications and provisioning rules were introduced, effective from 
January 1, 1998. A further step was an announcement in June 1998 by the Czech National 
Bank of new loan loss provisioning requirements. New regulation phases out the possibility of 
diminishing required provisions for loss loans  (in arrears for  more than one year) by the 
value  of real estate collateral. By the end 1998 banks are obliged to  provision the full value 
of loans in arrears of four or more years and by the end of 2000  all loss loans regardless of 
collateral
24/.    
 
In late 1997, the government announced plans to sell controlling stakes in the four largest 
banks - Komercni, Ceska Sporitelna, Investicni a Postovni and CSOB - to foreign strategic 
investors by the end of 1998.  Renowned international investment banks were hired to advise 
on the privatization of these banks. So far, Investicni a Postovni bank has been  sold to the 
Japanese investment house Nomura, but privatization prospects for the remaining three banks 
- and especially Komercni and Ceska Sporitelna - are uncertain. Important issues include 
whether these banks should be privatized on a stand alone basis or their bad debt portfolios 
                                                           
22 / See for instance; Moody’s Investor Service, “Banking System Outlook. Czech Republic” December 1997, p. 
6-7.   
23 / See: Standard & Poor’s . “BankSystem Report. Czech Republic”, July 1998, p.2. 
24 / See: Merrill Lynch (comment), “CNB Gets Tough on Provisions”, June 18, 1998. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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should be restructured prior to privatization. Another issue is whether the government  will 





The Hungarian banking sector poses the lowest systemic risk among banking sectors in 
Central Europe with stability factors being: 
•  the best asset quality in the region 
•  strong  capital adequacy 
•  low deposit to GDP and credit to GDP ratios 
•  domination of  control by foreign strategic investors.  
 
The potential risk factor in the future is OTP (National Savings Bank). OTP controls the bulk 
of retail deposits and is the main supplier of funds to the interbank market but may be non 
competitive in the medium term and has no effective  ownership control. A significant budget 
deficit, sizable public debt and total country external debt  leaves little  flexibility for use of 
fiscal resources to deal with potential banking problems. 
 
The score of the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Hungary is 1 (very low risk) for 




Hungary established a two-tier banking system in 1987. Ten years later, there were 43 
commercial banks, 243 savings cooperatives, and 8 specialized credit institutions. Six former 
state-owned banks accounted for  55% of  the sector’s assets. The savings cooperatives 
collectively had 5% of the sector’s assets. The biggest foreign start-up bank had 6% of the 
sector’s assets which constituted the fifth  largest market share. 
 
At the end of 1997, foreign investors had 61% of the sector’s subscribed capital and state 
ownership constituted 20%. 
 
Bank recapitalization  
 
In 1992 - 1994  the government spent about USD 3 billion, or 7-8% of country’s annual GDP 
to recapitalize  state-owned  banks in three consecutive operations known as loan, debtor and 
bank consolidation programs. These programs also brought relief to enterprises since their 
debt owed to recapitalized banks and to the state agencies could be rescheduled, reduced 
and/or converted into equity.  The need to repeat  recapitalization  was partly a result of the 
piecemeal  approach since  the first stage was to bring  banks’ capital adequacy to zero, the 
second to 4% and only the third to 8%. It seems, however, that the lack of proper incentives 
and unchecked moral hazard could have contributed to the high cost of the programs
25/. 
Enterprises got a free lunch in the form of  relief on their debt to banks and the state. Banks 
were also better off since they reduced non-performing credits and received government 
                                                           
25 / see: S. Szerekes, „Bad Loan Workouts: the Hungarian Experience”, in “Bank Rehabilitation and Enterprise 
Restructuring” edited by M. Simoneti and S. Kawalec, Central and East European Privatization Center, 
Ljubljana, Slovenia 1995.  S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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securities instead. Since full costs were born by the state, banks and enterprises were 




The experience of the very costly recapitalizations that had not fundamentally changed 
banking culture  had an impact on bank privatization strategy afterwards. The government 
decided to ensure proper bank governance through the sale of majority stakes in state banks to 
foreign strategic investors. Most major state-owned Hungarian  banks were sold to foreign 
financial institutions in 1994-1997.  Two important exceptions were banks dominating retail 
banking: National Savings  and Commercial Bank (OTP) and Postabank (the cases discussed 
below).  
 
Asset quality the best in the region. No capital deficiency 
 
The share of classified loans (in arrears for over 30 days) in the gross loan portfolio of 
Hungarian banks has declined from 30% in 1993 to 8% in 1997 and is the lowest in the 
region. Provision coverage of classified loans is 21% and thus the provision gap short of 60% 
coverage amounts to about 3.1% of gross loans or 0.7% of GDP
26/.   
 
Reported capital adequacy of Hungarian banking sector was 16.1% in 1997.  Capital cushion 
in excess of  12%  amounted to 1.7% of GDP and exceeded estimated provision gap by 1% of 
GDP.     
 
Postabank case and  quality of supervision 
 
Postabank – the fourth largest bank - had 6% of the sector’s assets and about 1/10 of  retail 
deposits as of the end of 1996. The bank was  partially privatized. Although state agencies or 
government related institutions dominated in its shareholder structure the bank was effectively  
controlled by the management. The bank pursued very aggressive credit expansion with some 
analysts attributing this aggressiveness to the need to generate income to cover the high 
overhead costs that Postabank incurs in using the facilities of the Post office. Dynamic 
expansion combined with inadequate credit control led to trouble. The bank experienced a run 
on deposits in early 1997  and was subsequently bailed out by the government which together 
with other participants put in 24 billion forints (about USD 130 million). An especially bad 
signal was the fact that the government effectively bailed-out the bank’s owners by not 
requiring a write down of capital prior recapitalization. The bank became 70% owned by state 
institutions and the government has been seeking a strategic investor to take control over the 
bank.  
 
The Postabank case is evidence of limited efficiency of banking regulations and supervision. 
Banking supervision is located in a separate agency – the Hungarian Banking and Capital 
Market Supervision (SSA). The head of SSA is appointed by the Minister of Finance for a 6 
year term. SSA was criticized for being too permissive in tackling Postabank’s problems as 
well as moving too late in case of two smaller banks PK Bank and Realbank. Some experts 
mention the lack of expertise at SSA as a cause for insufficient measures.  SSA, on the other 
hand, blames ineffective   legal powers of banking supervision. Some measures can only be 
                                                           
26 / See: comment to point 2) of the explanatory note on  the calculation of  Banking Sector Capital Deficiency 
(page ...). S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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taken if it is documented that the bank’s capital adequacy ratio is below half of the required 
value. This is often too late to take preventive action and in addition, Hungarian accounting 
regulations in some cases allow a bank  to avoid consolidation with its group although non-
consolidated accounts misrepresent  risk and real capital of the institution. Banking 
supervision decisions may be effectively challenged by banks and invalidated by courts. In 
practice, if there is no cooperation from bank management  or owners,   SSA is unable to 
force a bank to change its course or dismiss incompetent or fraudulent managers until it is too 
late to take preventive action. Notwithstanding these arguments it seems clear that in the 
Postabank case, strong political clout of  the bank’s private owners was hindering the SSA 




OTP -  with 24% of the sector’s assets and 56% of retail deposits – is the biggest bank and the 
main supplier of funds to the interbank market. It was privatized in 1995 through a public 
offering including a GDR issue and has a dispersed ownership structure. A “golden share” 
held by the state and special provisions in the articles of association prevent any potential 
strategic investor from taking control over the bank. OTP is now a blue chip stock in Central 
European banking. However, growing competition, the lack of  strategic investor, difficulties 
in containing high expenses as well moral hazard  created by its perceived “too big to fail” 
position may potentially  lead to future difficulties.  
 
Little fiscal flexibility but also low worst case contingent liability 
 
Hungary has a significant budget deficit (4.9% in 1997), sizable public debt/GDP ratio  (67%) 
and total economy foreign debt/GDP ratio (48%) which limit flexibility for the use of fiscal 
resources to deal with  potential banking problems. 
S&P included Hungary to a category of countries where potential contingent liability of the 
government to support banking sector “in a reasonable worst-case scenario” may be between 
15% and 30% of loans to the non-government sector. With non-government credit to GDP 
ratio of 21% ,  maximum  contingent liability would amount to about 6% of GDP which 




The Polish banking sector poses low systemic risk with stability factors being: 
•  strict regulations, high transparency and the best in the region banking supervision  
•  successful restructuring of the bulk of bad debt portfolio from the early years of 
transformation in a way that changed bank management culture and addressed borrower 
health  
•  relatively good asset quality  
•  high level of  provision coverage  
•  low deposit to GDP and credit to GDP ratios.   
 
There are important problems that still need to be addressed including the  restructuring and 
privatization of PKO BP (State Savings Bank)  and BGZ (Bank of Food Economy). There are 
significant government contingent liabilities related to the old housing loan  portfolio of State 
Savings Bank as well as to the capital deficiency of the country’s dominant insurer PZU. 
 S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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Government contingent liability to support banking sector can be manageable taking into 
account  the country’s fiscal and external positions. 
 
The score of the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Poland is 1 (very low risk) for the 




At the end of 1997  state controlled banks had 50% of assets, 44% of customer loans,   58% of  
customer deposits and 32% of equity  of the Polish banking sector. Out of 81 commercial 
banks, 28 were majority owned by foreign investors. Majority foreign owned banks had 27% 
equity and  15% of assets of the banking sector.  
 
Bank restructuring and recapitalization 
 
Poland implemented an innovative bank and enterprise restructuring program in 1993-1994 
that focused on nine state-owned regional banks. Seven of these banks were recapitalized to  
enable them to create adequate loan loss provisions and achieve at least 12% capital 
adequacy. The 1993 law on financial restructuring of enterprises and banks created  a 
mechanism that encouraged and ultimately compelled recapitalized banks to undertake 
specific actions against bad debtors. One such action could be a conciliation agreement 
between a debtor and creditors  including the possibility of debt relief and/or debt equity 
swaps to support the debtor’s restructuring efforts. The program was instrumental in restoring 
bank solvency, contributing to restructuring and privatization of  some enterprises, changing 
bank culture and containing moral hazard
27/.  
 
In 1993-1996, the government also recapitalized three big specialized banks:  PKO BP – state 
savings bank, Pekao S.A. – former foreign currency deposits bank, and Bank of Food 
Economy (BGZ). Although the  framework of  the law on financial restructuring of 
enterprises and banks was partly used,  the approach to  the recapitalization of these 
specialized banks was not comprehensive  and imposition of disciplinary measures was weak.  
 
In total, between 1993 and 1996 the government recapitalized 10 state-owned banks providing 
them with treasury bonds with a nominal value  of about PLN 4.7  billion ( USD 2.3 billion)  
or  2.4% of an annual GDP, of which  45% in real terms was spent on the Bank of Food 
Economy (BGZ). 
 
While the government bore the cost of capital injections for state-owned banks directly, the 
Central Bank bore the direct and indirect costs of  rehabilitation or liquidation of a number of  
smaller private banks. Some of these banks were taken over by the Central Bank and then sold 
after restructuring. Some were taken over by other banks with Central Bank support such as 
long-term soft financing and/or waiver for mandatory reserve requirements. Total costs of  
Central Bank intervention – including the waiver for mandatory reserve given to BGZ - were 
not disclosed but could have been about  0.5 %  of GDP. 
                                                           
27/ See: S. Kawalec, S. Sikora and  P. Rymaszewski, “Polish Program of Bank and Enterprise Restructuring 
Design and Implementation 1991-1994” in “Bank Rehabilitation and Enterprise Restructuring” edited by M. 
Simoneti and S. Kawalec, Central and East European Privatization Center, Ljubljana, Slovenia 1995.  
F. Montes-Negret, L. Papi, “The Polish Experience with bank and Enterprise Restructuring“, Policy Research 




In 1993-1997,  14 foreign banks applying for banking licenses in Poland were required by the 
Central Bank to spend about PLN 170 million to support  troubled small banks (by taking 
over a bank or  providing a bank with preferential  subordinated financing or providing soft 
financing  for another bank that was taking over a troubled institution)
 28/. The average  price 
for a license came out to approximately  USD 5 million.  
 
PKO and BGZ capital deficiencies  
 
PKO – the state savings bank - has a 23% share in banking assets and 35% in retail deposits.  
12% of  PKO’s assets  constitute old housing loans where interest is capitalized and 
repurchased  from the bank by the government on a regular basis. The auditors’ opinion in the 
Annual Report for 1997 emphasizes that this support is indispensable to ensure the continuity 
of PKO’s operations. The value of  old housing loans in the amount of  PLN 5.7 billion (USD 
1.6 billion) in fact constitutes a hidden liability of the government. In order to prepare PKO 
for privatization, the old housing loan  portfolio may be taken over by a government agency (a 
specialized state-owned bank) and PKO would in return receive government securities. 
 
BGZ – Bank of Food Economy – has a 6%  share in banking assets. After the huge 
recapitalization mentioned above, it had only PLN 0.1 billion capital at the end of 1997 with 
PLN 12.3 billion of assets. Auditors stated in their opinion that there is substantial doubt 
whether BGZ would be able to continue as a going concern. The capital deficiency to achieve 
capital assets ratio of 8% (a proxy for 12% risk weighted capital adequacy) was PLN 0.9 
billion. 
  
 Capital deficiency of the banking sector 
 
As of the end of 1997, classified loans (in arrears for more than 30 days) constituted 10.1% of 
gross loans in the Polish banking sector or  about  2% of GDP.  Provision coverage of   
classified loans was about 52%. The provision gap to achieve 60% coverage amounted to 
PLN 0.8 billion or 0.2% of GDP.   
 
It is estimated that the capital adequacy of the banking sector in Poland is about 10% which is 
above the internationally accepted level of 8% although below the 12% recommended for 
transition countries by the Basle Committee. Capital shortage to reach 12% is estimated to be 
about  PLN 3.6 billion or about 0.7% of GDP.  
 
Given the value of PKO’s old housing loan portfolio, the sector’s provision gap and the 
capital necessary to increase capital adequacy from 10% to 12%, the total capital deficiency 
of the sector can be estimated to be around PLN 10 billion or 2.2% of GDP. 
 
Government ability to deal with the problems 
 
The government’s contingent liability to support the sector is easily manageable taking into 
account the limited size of the liability and adequate fiscal flexibility. 
 
                                                           
28/ S. Kubielas, “Rola banków zagranicznych w prywatyzacji i konsolidacji polskiego sektora bankowego” (Role 
of  foreign banks in the privatization and consolidation of Polish banking sector), paper for Nicom Consulting 
Lld. and “Gazeta Bankowa” conference, Warsaw, September 21, 1998. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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3.5. Romania  
 
The Romanian banking sector is in extremely poor shape.  The main reasons are the lack of 
privatization and restructuring of enterprises and banks combined with accommodating   
macroeconomic policy over most of the 1990s.  
 
The score of the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Romania  is 5 (very high risk) for 
both the short  and medium term.  
 
Suspended  transition  
 
Big state enterprises were kept running through the generous supply of credit from major 
state-owned banks which until 1997 were continuously refinanced by the Central Bank. As a 
result,  restructuring of the economy under market conditions has been suspended which  is 
also reflected in the fact that in 1993-1996 the share of industry in GDP not only had not been 
decreasing but had actually increased from 33.8 to 36%. By contrast in the same period in 
Poland, this share had declined from 32.9% in 1993 to 27.1% in 1996
29/. 
 
Financial situation of enterprises and banks in 1996 
 
Although accommodating macroeconomic policy and direct credit windows kept the post-
socialist industrial organizations alive, the financial situation of  the enterprise sector in 1996 
was already extremely  poor. This was reflected in the quality of bank loan portfolios. Loans  
classified as non standard constituted 89% of total credit to non-government
30/ or about 22% 
of GDP. Loan loss provisions constituted 10.6% of classified loans value. Provision gap short 
to achieve 60% provision coverage of classified loans was lei 11.7 trillion  or 11% of GDP.  
 
The sector’s reported capital/assets ratio was 9.4%. Capital deficiency to create adequate 
provisions and maintain capital assets ratio of 8% (proxy for 12% risk weighted capital 
adequacy ratio) was about lei 11 trillion or 10% of GDP.  
 
Dramatic deterioration in  1997-1998  
  
The authorities initiated  a  program aimed at stabilizing the economy and implementing  deep 
institutional and structural changes in March  1997. Monetary policy was tightened and 
special credit windows of the Central Bank were closed. Authorities lacked the determination  
to complete the program’s implementation. Steps in the area of  institutional reforms and 
privatization were largely not taken.  After several  months, monetary policy was eased - 
although special credit windows were not reopened. The program’s goals were not achieved 
and costs of this half hearted approach have been  very high. Real GDP declined  by 6.6% in 
1997 and about 7.3%  in 1998. The cumulative drop in output was 13.4% over the two years 
1997-1998. Such a significant drop in real GDP resulted  in the dramatic deterioration of the 
financial condition of the enterprise sector and consequently in the deterioration of the quality 
of loan portfolios of the commercial banks. Two major banks Bank Agricola and Bankorex, 
faced significant liquidity problems in 1997 and were supported by capital injection 
                                                           
29/ In the period 1993-1996 in both countries real GDP was growing with average annual rate 4.1% in Romania 
and 5,5% in Poland.  
30/ Moody￿s Investor Service, “Banking System Outlook. Romania”, February 1998,p. 8. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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amounting to about 3.5% of GDP.   In  the meantime, high inflation  in 1997 diminished the 
loans to GDP ratio from 19% to 13%.  
 
Sector capital deficiency may amount to 7%  of GDP in 1997  
 
The sector’s capital deficiency as of the end of 1996 was estimated to be about 10% of GDP 
or 52% of the value of the gross loan portfolio. The drop in real GDP of 6.6% in 1997 is 
expected to have resulted in the deterioration in the financial condition of the enterprise sector 
and consequently in the deterioration of the quality of bank loan portfolios. In the meantime, 
however, high inflation  in 1997 diminished the loans to GDP ratio from 19% to 13% and two 
major banks were supported by capital injections amounting to about 3.5% of GDP.  
 
I do not have  data on loan classification and provision coverage in 1997. It may be 
hypothetically assumed that  recapitalization counterbalanced the impact of  the recession and 
the sector’s  capital deficiency also stayed at the level of 52% of the value of gross loan 
portfolio at the end of 1997. This would mean a sector capital deficiency of about 7% of GDP 
in 1997.  
 
Potential increase of bank  losses 
 
S&P included Romania in the category of countries where potential contingent liability of the 
government to support banking sector “in a reasonable worst-case scenario” may be between 
35% and 60% of loans to the non-government sector. 60% of loan portfolio would equal 
about 8% of GDP.  According to our estimation, banking sector capital deficiency in 1996 and 
1997  already amounted to 52% of  the value gross loans to the non government sector which  
was  very close to S&P’s upper limit for a worst case scenario. The increase of the sector’s 
capital deficiency to this limit or even slightly beyond in 1998 is possible.  
 
Government ability to deal with the problems 
 
With credit to GDP ratio of 13% and deposits to GDP ratio of  16% government contingent 
liability to support banking sector could be manageable even in the worst scenario, since the 
general government debt to GDP ratio of  33% and  total economy foreign debt to GDP ratio 
of 23% are modest. However, a significant fiscal deficit (5% in 1998E) and the recession 
limits fiscal flexibility. In addition, Romania’s external position became very tight. The 
current account deficit was 7.2% of GDP in 1997 and was estimated at 5.3% in 1998. In the 
aftermath of Russian crisis spreads on Romania’s Eurobonds (over US Treasury bonds or 
German Central Bank bonds) skyrocketed from 3.6% - 3.9% until mid August 1998 to  19% - 
57% in the second half of September 1998. In these circumstances the current account's 
dramatic improvement is likely to be forced out by the inability to finance the deficit. 
 
Government ability to address origins of the banking problems is uncertain in light of the 




Slovakia is highly exposed to banking sector systemic risk term since: 
 
•  Non-government credit to GDP ratio of 56% is significant. 
 S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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•  Major state controlled banks are overburdened by non-performing loans and some of these 
banks are dramatically eroded by lending to related parties. 
 
•  Government policy of using the funds of  the country’s biggest insurer to support a  major 
troubled  bank as well as transferring control over this insurer to a cash thirsty industrial 
company spreads contagion from the banking to the insurance sector,  increasing 
government contingent liability to support financial sector. 
 
•  High current account deficit is financed mostly through short term borrowings. As a result 
of loss of investment grade and the Russian crisis, the unavailability of financing is likely 
to force out dramatic current account improvement. Significant currency depreciation may 
cause severe losses for enterprise sector because of exposure to currency risk. 
 
•  The expected economic slowdown as a result of diminished access to foreign financing, 
the consequences of the Russian crisis and the Czech economic slowdown will result in 
further deterioration of bank loan portfolios. 
 
The score of the Banking Sector Systemic Risk assigned to Slovakia  is 5 (very high risk) for 
both the short  and medium term. Banking sector problems may cause major economic and 
political destabilization unless they are dealt  with both decisively and in a way  that supports, 
not undermines, confidence.  
 
The market structure 
 
The 28 banks and 2 branches of foreign banks that operated in Slovakia in 1997 can be 
divided into two groups. The first consists of three state-owned or former state-owned banks - 
Slovenska Sporitelna (SS),  Vseobecna Uverova Banka (VUB) and Investicna a Rozvojova 
Banka (IRB) – that are in the process of being restructured (called restructured banks further 
on). The second  group encompasses all other banks. 
 
The restructured banks  have a common history with major Czech banks as they were carved 
out from the same the Czechoslovak banking system. Slovak banks benefited from measures 
undertaken by Czechoslovak government in 1991 and 1992 to clean up bank assets. This 
includes about US$ 1.2. billion  provided in  1991 and  1992 to Slovakian Vseobecna Userova 
Banka (VUB) when the newly created bank hospital Konsolidacni Banka took over pre-1991 
bad debts. Two of the restructured banks VUB and IRB were partially privatized in  the 
coupon privatization in former Czechoslovakia with the controlling stake remaining in the 
hands of the state. 
 
The share of the three restructured banks in the banking assets fell from about 72% in 1993 to 
about 50% at the end of 1997. The restructured banks had 68% of banking sector's assets in 
1997 measured on a risk weighted basis and the majority of deposits and credits of the system.  
 
The other banks, especially foreign and joint-venture banks, have been growing fast. 
However, their share in total assets (about  50% in 1997) exceeded significantly the share in 
risk weighted assets (of 32%) and share in credits and deposits. This is partly because total 
assets of other banks are inflated by the activity of foreign banks artificially increasing their 
foreign assets and liabilities to comply with awkward foreign currency regulations (see 
segment Macroeconomic stability below). 
 S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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Foreign capital participation in banking sector capital was  reported to be 39% in September 
1997
31/ . However, since the main country of origin of foreign capital was the Czech 
Republic, it seems that a part of this foreign capital participation are just shares of Czech 
Government institutions inherited from former Czechoslovakia. 
 
The shape of the three restructured banks that dominate the sector 
 
SS – a state savings bank – has 23% of banking sector assets and  the bulk of retail deposits, 
and is the dominant provider of funds to the interbank market.  
 
Majority state-owned VUB has 22% share in the sector’s assets. It dominates corporate 
banking with about 33% share in total sector’s lending and is a net borrower on the interbank 
market. Loans and guarantees provided by VUB to related parties amounted to Sk 21 billion 
or US$ 600 million as of the end of 1997 which exceeded several times over the bank’s 
reported equity.    
 
IRB which has a 5% share in the sector’s assets was placed under the Central Bank 
administration in December 1997. 
 
In the case of  VUB and IRB auditors qualify  their opinions presented  in 1997 annual reports 
stating that the banks may not be able to continue normal operations as going concerns in the 
future unless several conditions are met including continued co-operation and support of the 
National Bank of Slovakia and relevant government institutions. 
 
 
Loan provision gap in the restructured banks 
 
The provision gap is estimated mostly based on data from 1997 annual reports of  the 
restructured banks and additional hypothetical assumptions.   
 
At the end of 1997, gross loan portfolio of the restructured banks amounted to about Sk 218 
billion, of which 54% belonged to VUB, 30% to SS and 16% to IRB. For VUB, the exact 
amount of classified loans (i.e. loans in arrears for more than 30 days) was disclosed in the 
Annual Report and constitutes 61.6% of its gross loan portfolio. I assume that the share of 
classified loans in the portfolios of SS and IRB is the same 
32/ giving a total amount of  Sk 
137 billion of classified loans in the three banks. 
Consequently, the estimated required amount of provisions in the restructured banks should 
be about Sk 82 billion. Actual provisions were Sk 50  billion, which gives a loan provision 
gap in the restructured banks of  Sk 32 billion.  
 
                                                           
31 / Moody’s Investor Service, ”Banking  System Outlook. Slovakia”, June 1998, p.10. 
32 / High share of classified loans in SS is very likely since 72% of  loans of this saving bank has been extended 
to corporate sector and other legal entities. Experience of  the Polish counterpart of SS (PKO BP) in the early 
1990s shows that  a former specialized savings banks entering commercial banking in a transition economy may 
have a significantly bigger share of bad loans in their corporate portfolio than banks that formerly specialized in 
financing enterprises (see: S. Kawalec , “Reshaping Former Savings Banks: Options and Risks”, Paper for the 
Policy Seminar  “On selected Topics in Banking System Development and Reform”, Organized by the World 
Bank in association  with the National Bank of Ukraine and the Association of Ukrainian Banks, Puscha 
Ozernaya, Kiev, Ukraine, November 1-3, 1996). IRB because of high share of non-performing loans encountered 
liquidity problems and had to be taken under central bank administration in December 1997. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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Other justified deductions from reported capital base 
 
In addition to the loan provision gap I believe some other deductions from the reported capital 
base of the restructured banks to be justified. In the case of SS, I deduct Sk 1.3 billion of 
unrealized gains on dealing securities where the market is dominated by SS
33/. In the case of 
VUB and IRB, I deduct the aggregate amount of Sk 11.1 billion constituting 50% value of 
loans and exposures of these banks to related parties
34/.  
 
Aggregated capital deficiency of restructured  banks 
  
Taking into account the reported capital base of restructured banks, the loan provision gap and 
other justified deductions from the reported capital base described above, I believe aggregated 
capital deficiency that for the restructured banks (to fill provision gap and increase 
capital/assets ratio to 8%)  amounted to  Sk 58 billion (USD 1.7 billion) as of end of 1997. 
 
Capital deficiency of other banks 
 
I have less information on other banks. According to the Central Bank, predicted uncovered 
losses in other banks as of end of 1997 were less than ¼ of  those in the restructured banks 
(18.6% and 81.4% respectively of total predicted uncovered losses of the sector). I assume 
that this proportion applies to the loan provision gap as well. Thus the loan provision gap in 
other banks is estimated to be Sk 9.3 billion. I assume that apart from the above loan 
provision gap the other banks are adequately capitalized  (Having risk weighted assets lower 
than restructured bank, the other banks have reported capital almost three times higher than 
the restructured banks: 73 %  and 27  % of the sector’s reported capital respectively). 
 
Total capital deficiency of Slovak banks 
 
Summing up above estimates of capital deficiency of the restructured banks and of the other 
banks,  we come out with the amount of Sk 74 billion - the equivalent of USD 1,9 billion or 
9,6% of Slovakia’s DGP – as the total capital deficiency of Slovak banks as of the end 1997. 
 
IRB case – contagion spreads to insurance sector  
 
IRB was 35% owned by government bodies until VSZ, a Slovak steel maker, took control of 
40% IRB’s shares in 1996 through direct and indirect shareholdings gaining effective control 
against the will of the Central Bank. IRB would have failed in 1997 if it had not been given a 
huge liquidity injection from the Central Bank. Since VSZ refused to increase the capital of 
IRB, the bank was placed under the Central Bank administration in December 1997. The 
Central Bank declared that IRB would be quickly privatized through a sale to a strategic 
investor. Ultimately, a controlling stake in IRB was sold for Sk 2 billion (USD 58 million) at 
the end of 1997 to Slovenska Pojistovna (SP) – a state-owned insurer which has 60% of the 
country’s insurance market. SP also placed deposits of Sk 4 billion to support IRB liquidity. It 
                                                           
33/  Dealing securities in question include: municipal, corporate and bank bonds, promissory noted and shares. 
See: Slovenska Sporitelna. Annual Report 1997, pp. 36,42 and 44. 
34/ I assume that in VUB and IRB it is  justified to require 50% provision for  standard category related parties 
loans and 100% for classified related parties loans. Annual reports of these two banks do not provide information 
on what (if any) percentage of related parties loans is classified and what (if any) amount of provisions is created 
against these exposures. There is a possibility of some double counting in my calculation if a significant part of 
related parties loans is classified and even more if provision coverage for these loans is significant. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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means that in the last weeks of 1997 SP disbursed a total of Sk 6 billion (USD 173 million) - 
about 2/3 of its annual revenues - to  support IRB.  
 
IRB reported negative capital amounting to Sk 4 billion (USD 116 million) at the end of 1997. 
Total  liabilities of IRB were Sk 39.2 billion (US$ 1.1 billion) of which 58% were owed to the 
Central Bank
 35/ . The second biggest source of  funds was the new shareholder SP whose 
deposit constituted 10% of total liabilities and  48% of customer deposits. The third biggest 
financier was the savings bank  Slovenska Sporitelna whose deposit constituted 8% of  total 
liabilities and 84% of interbank funds generated by IRB. In total, these three state controlled 
institutions (the Central Bank, SS and SP) accounted for 76% of  IRB’s funding while the 
bank hardly had a significant genuine customer deposit base.  IRB’s loan and other exposures 
to VSZ and companies connected to VSZ were reported to amount to Sk 0.8 billion (USD 23 
million).  
 
VSZ acquired  a controlling stake  in  IRB’s new dominant shareholder SP in 1998. It 
happened through a new share issue which enabled VSZ to replace the government  as the 
major shareholder of  the insurer
36/. The transaction was later cancelled. 
 
The involvement of Slovenska Poistovna and Slovenska Sporitelna in a bank with 
questionable business viability and the subsequent involvement of  VSZ  in SP creates serious 
concern.  Sk 3 billion deposit placed in IRB constitutes  1.8% of SS’s assets and about half of 
its reported equity. The disbursement of about 2/3 of SP's annual revenues to support IRB is 
likely to have a very serious impact on the financial viability of the Slovakia’s main insurer. 
In the case of an insurance company, as long as premium collection grows from year to year, 
insolvency may not translate itself into illiquidity. It seems likely that VSZ took control over 
the insurer to be able to tap its liquidity. These developments may lead to further losses and 




Slovakia’s external position looked very vulnerable in 1996 and 1997 in light of indicators 
such as a high current account deficit, significant fiscal deficit, an appreciated real exchange 
rate, a weak banking sector, high external debt with rising proportion of short term debt  and a 
modest level of foreign reserves
37/.  
 
One important indicator,  the ratio of  short term foreign debt to foreign reserves – which at 
the end of 1997 was at an alarming level above 100% -  can be misleading. The level of short 
term foreign borrowings is inflated by activities of foreign banks in Slovakia triggered by the 
awkward construction of  regulation introduced in 1996. According to this regulation the 
value of foreign assets of a bank have to constitute at least 80% of  the value of foreign 
liabilities
38/. Foreign banks in Slovakia borrowed therefore extensively from abroad, 
                                                           
35/ During 1997 IRB’s liabilities to the central Bank increased by SK 8 billion. 
36/ “Slovakia. Control freaks”, The Economist, August 29, 1998,p.72-73. 
37 / See: M. Krzak,  “Large Current Account Deficits –The Case of Central European and the Baltic Countries”, 
Focus on Transition (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna), No I/1998, pp.22-46.  
38/Regulation introduced in July 1996 obliged the banks to achieve a ratio of foreign currency assets to foreign 
liabilities of at least 65% by the end of 1996. This floor was subsequently increased up to  80% effective since 
July 1, 1997. In the calculation of this ratio only foreign currency assets to non-residents are included while the 
denominator includes foreign exchange liabilities to both residents and non-residents as well as local currency 
liabilities to non-residents. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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increasing their foreign currency liabilities, and reinvested 80% or so  of these borrowings 
abroad (presumably in liquid assets) to meet regulatory limits while having sizable residual 
amount of foreign liabilities financing domestic assets. Since the regulation was introduced in 
mid-1996 until September 1997, short term foreign debt by banks Slovakia increased from 
USD  0.5 billion to USD 2.6 billion
39/. As a result, at the end of 1997 the bulk of the Slovak 
economy's short term foreign debt were borrowings made by banks offset by liquid foreign 
assets. 
 
There are also other factors of stability: low level of foreign investment with  negligible 
portfolio flows limits room for currency speculation; restrictions on internal convertibility of 




Slovakia’s used to have an investment grade rating but was downgraded to a speculative 
grade in 1998. Later in the year, in the aftermath of Russian crisis spreads on Slovakia’s 
Eurobonds (over US Treasury bonds) skyrocketed from around 4% in mid August 1998 to 
above 12% in the second half of September 1998 and declined to 5-6% in March 1999.During 
the Russian crisis Slovakia had to change its exchange rate arrangements but the depreciation 
of the Slovak koruna was relatively modest (about 15% in nominal terms from early August 
1998 until the end of March 1999). 
 
The future of Slovakia’s external position remains very uncertain. Significant currency 
depreciation may cause severe losses for the enterprise sector because of exposure to currency 
risk. The recession in Czech Republic and the crisis in Russia
41/ will  contribute to the 
aggravation of a likely economic slowdown. 
 




Potential increase of bank  losses 
 
S&P included Slovakia in the category of countries where potential contingent liability of the 
government to support banking sector “in a reasonable worst-case scenario” may reach up to 
40% of loans to the non-government sector. In December 1997, credit to the non-government 
sector amounted to 52% of Slovakia’s GDP; 40% of the credit portfolio would equal 21% of 
GDP.  With our estimation of banking sector capital deficiency of 9.6% of GDP in 1997, 
deterioration by an additional 11%  of GDP (or even more) in 1998 and 1999 is not an  
impossible to imagine bad case scenario. 
 
Government ability to deal with the problems 
 
So far, the government’s contingent liability to support the banking sector could be 
manageable since general government debt  is at a modest level of 28% of GDP. However, a 
                                                           
39 /  Data of The  Central Bank – see: Moody’s Investor Service, „Banking System Outlook. Slovakia”, June 
1998, p.15.   
40 / M.Krzak, op.cit. p.42. 
41 / In 1997, exports to the Czech Republic amounted to 16% of Slovakia’s GDP and exports to CIS countries 
amounted to 3% of GDP. S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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significant budget deficit (4% in 1998) limits fiscal flexibility. In addition, the rapidly 




Key challenges and policy recommendations 
 
 
All six countries underwent banking crises in the 1990s and spent significant budgetary 
resources to deal with them. Crises have been overcome without system destabilization only 
in Hungary and Poland.  Now, the banking sectors in these two countries are relatively robust 
although  small in relation to GDP. 
 
In Bulgaria a banking crisis ended with a major destabilization, dramatic downsizing of 
banking assets and  a deep recession. Presently, the banking sector is reported to be liquid and 
solvent and the potential for asset quality deterioration is limited for some time. 
 
Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have yet to deal with their continuing banking 
crises which still constitute a danger for economic stability and development. The deep 
banking crisis in Romania has been undermining  confidence in banks, threatening their   
liquidity and eroding banking balance sheet. So far, persistent banking crises in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have not destabilized their banking systems. This is because of the  
stable macroeconomic stance and the perception that  the governments is  committed and able 




•  Improvement in the shape of banking sector in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania as 
well as  its future soundness in Bulgaria are dependent on changes in the microeconomy 
and progress in restructuring the industrial sector. On the other hand, a change in bank 
behavior is necessary for real restructuring of the industrial sector. 
 
•  In  Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria  a key issue  is how to ensure the soundness of banking 
sector in the medium and longer term in a likely period of growing  monetization and 
dynamic expansion of domestic credit and when costs of potential financial instability will 
increase significantly. 
 
•  In Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania a key issue is how to resolve  existing banking 
crises and avoid crisis repetitions. 
 
•  In the medium term, all six countries will have to deal with the potential  instability of  
international capital flows and risk of currency crisis. 
 
In order to face these challenges sound macroeconomic policies should be pursued. Three 
policy areas should be addressed in particular: 
•  crisis resolution – dealing with bank capital deficiencies and bad debt restructuring (in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania) 
•  bank privatization (in all countries except Hungary) 
•  strengthening of regulatory and institutional framework (in all countries). 
 S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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These policy areas are discussed in this Section. A separate section is devoted to systemic 
liquidity risk connected with the Year 2000 problem. 
 
 
4.1.  Crisis resolution – dealing with bank capital deficiencies and bad debt 
restructuring 
 
Restructuring and recapitalization 
 
Banks which are not to be liquidated should be adequately restructured to restore  solvency, 
liquidity and profitability. The key element of restructuring an insolvent bank is 
recapitalization. It should allow the bank to create adequate provisions against bad exposures 
and assure that after creating the necessary provisions the bank would reach capital adequacy 
with a safe cushion above the minimum regulatory level. 
 
 
Who should recapitalize 
 
If the bank has negative capital and the government does not want its liquidation, the rights of 
former non-state shareholder should be cancelled and the bank  should be  recapitalized either 
by the government or by new private  owners.  
 
It would be  good if  a troubled bank could be quickly sold to a strong, fit and proper strategic 
investor ready to inject new capital and restructure the institution. However, this solution is 
often unfeasible.  There may be no acceptable buyers willing to inject money into an insolvent 
bank or the government may not be ready to accept their  terms
42/. Trying to sell quickly in 
this type of situation  without previous restructuring may in fact result in delaying both 
restructuring and privatization.  
 
How to deal with bad debt and bad borrowers 
 
In  the Czech Republic ,  Slovakia,  and Romania, the shape of the banking sector is related to 
the poor shape of the microeconomic situation. Lack of restructuring of the industrial sector is 
reflected in the poor quality of loan portfolios and the high share of bad loans. At the same 
time, the lack of restructuring of the banking sector and the behavior of banks allow big 
inefficient companies to delay restructuring and continue inefficient activities. For this reason, 
improvement in the banking sector is  dependent on changes in the microeconomic situation 
and progress in restructuring the industrial sector. On the other hand, a change in bank 
behavior is necessary for real restructuring of the industrial sector. 
 
Taking into account that major state-controlled banks have already benefited from the 
government support, bad debt resolution should focus on changing banks’  behavior and   
should be connected with bank privatization.  
 
                                                           
42 / In trying to transfer a big  insolvent  bank to a strategic investor the government may be forced  to accept no 
or only a token payment, give a free hand to the buyer allowing divestiture or liquidation of  less interesting parts 
of  the institutions and staff reductions. In addition, buyers may demand government guarantees (such as limiting 
maximum size of losses on an existing portfolio) and direct or indirect subsidies and privileges  to diminish risk 
and improve the economics of their investment. 
 S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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It would also be advisable if bank rehabilitation  contributed to industrial sector restructuring.   
To this aim bad borrowers should not receive easy debt relief because it could allow them to 
continue previous    activities.  Carving out bad claims and transferring  them to a government 
sponsored bank hospital - be it an existing one like Konsolidacni Banka or a newly created 
institution - is not a recommended solution either. Experience  shows that this type of 
institution - especially in transition economies - is subject to political  pressure, lack proper 
motivation and therefore  are unlikely to vigorously and effectively recover bad debt and/or 
force debtor restructuring.  
 
A solution could be considered  in which banks are properly recapitalized, create adequate 
provisions against bad debts and bad debt is separated within the banks and subject to 
management of special work-out units. Safeguards against financing bad debtors with new 
loans should be introduced. Banks could be obliged to restructure bad debts within  defined 
time period – for instance one year. One possible way of restructuring bad debts by banks 
could be the public sale of the debt on secondary market. One potential group of buyers could 
be the firms with the financial obligations vis-a-vis bad debtors
43/.  
 
An alternative solution could be that bad debts are carved out of bank balance sheets and 
taken over by the government in exchange for interest bearing bonds. However, under an 
agency agreement  banks continue to administer these loans and are responsible for their 








The key objective of bank privatization should be to create the best conditions for  long term 
development,  soundness and efficiency of the privatized institution.   
 
Formal versus genuine privatization 
 
It is essential to differentiate between actual privatization where control of the company is 
transferred to private investors and purely formal privatization where the state sells over 50% 
of shares to private investors but retains the controlling stake. Formal privatization can be the 
first step toward authentic privatization but in itself can only make limited qualitative changes 
since the management of the bank remains dependent on state administration. The 
developments in the  Czech banking sector in the 1990s  discussed earlier shows the limited 
effects of  formal privatization. 
 
                                                           
43 / See:  S. Kawalec, S. Sikora and  P. Rymaszewski, “Polish Program of Bank and Enterprise Restructuring 
Design and Implementation 1991-1994” in “Bank Rehabilitation and Enterprise Restructuring” edited by M. 
Simoneti and S. Kawalec, Central and Eastern European Privatization Center, Ljubljana, Slovenia 1995.  
 
44 / Solution adopted in the restructuring of the Universal Bank of Latvia in 1993. 
 
45 / In this paragraph I draw heavily from the paper:  S.Kawalec, , A. Nieradko and C. Stypułkowski, „In search 
of compromise on contradictory privatization goals: The case of Bank Handlowy”, Central European Banker, 
February 1999. 
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Genuine privatization does not have to guarantee success 
 
Experience shows, however, that the act of genuine privatization alone does not necessarily 
create a strong  and sound bank. The experiences of Chile and Israel in the 1980's and of 
Mexico in the 1990's are proof enough. All three countries were at first proud of the rapid 
privatization of the largest banks but soon after they were forced to spend vast budgetary 
funds to rescue the recently privatized banks.  
 
Appropriate owners are indispensable for success of bank privatization 
 
The weakness of prudential regulations and poor bank supervision contributed to the post-
privatization banking crises in Israel, Chile and Mexico. Appropriate prudential regulations 
and accounting principles, the requirement to publish financial information, independent 
audits and efficient bank supervision can significantly increase the safety of the banking 
system. However, improvement in the efficiency of legal and institutional infrastructure in 
this respect cannot take place overnight. Furthermore, regulations and bank supervision 
cannot replace a qualified management and shareholders with understanding of the banking 
business.  
 
Issue of strategic  investor and search of alternative privatization schemes 
 
The development and safety of the bank could be best ensured through the right strategic 
investor capable of efficiently controlling the bank, transferring know-how and of financial 
support in a crisis situation. In transition countries were the economy has a relatively short 
history of operating under market conditions there is a lack of institutions that can become a 
reliable strategic investor. Foreign institutions are often the only potential candidates  for the 
role. 
 
Thus quick privatization through strategic foreign investors can lead to a situation  when all 
major banks in a country are subsidiaries or branches of  foreign banks. This would not be 
acceptable for most industrial countries and  no wonder that it  may create resistance in 
transition economies
46/. Fear that leading domestic banks may be taken-over by foreign 
institutions and will lose their national character strongly affects privatization decisions in 
many countries. It often results either in delaying bank privatization for many years, or in  
formal privatization where the state retains the controlling stake, in transferring control to 
domestic private investors who are unable to strengthen the bank or in a search for alternative 
privatization schemes. 
 
In Hungary, the National Savings and Commercial Bank (OTP Bank)  that holds the majority 
of the country’s retail deposit was privatized in such a way as to assure dispersed ownership 
and exclude foreign  control.  The bulk of shares were sold to portfolio investors. The Articles 
of Association restricted the maximum stake of any one non-Hungarian shareholder to no 
more than 5% of share capital and voting rights
47/. OTP is now a blue chip stock in Central 
                                                           
46 / The fact that foreign strategic investors are more competent that local ones is important but does not always 
have to be the decisive factor. For instance, the fact that in a number of countries key government positions are 
filled with people without adequate professionalism does not lead everyone to the conclusion that the 
government should be run by more competent foreign professionals.   
 
47 / OTP Bank (National Savings and Commercial Bank Ltd),  Information Memorandum, 11 July 1995, p. 105.  
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European banking. However, growing competition and no effective  ownership control may 
potentially  lead to future difficulties.  
 
In the case of Bank Handlowy (a leading Polish corporate bank privatized in 1997) the State 
Treasury retained special participating convertible bonds (passive shares) and has a 29% stake 
in the current and future market value of the Bank but only 7% of voting rights. A group of 
core shareholders made up of three renowned financial institutions representing different 
areas of financial services and geographical regions (J.P. Morgan, Zurich Insurance Company 
and Sparbanken Sverige -Swedbank) secured 26% of voting rights that, given the dispersion 
of the remaining shareholders, provides dominant influence on the bank. The core 
shareholders signed cooperation agreements on supporting the bank in specific areas of 
financial services. The ownership structure was complemented by international portfolio 
investors and by domestic individual investors attracted by special  incentives. The bank 




It is advisable to sell most state-controlled banks to foreign strategic investors. However, it is 
not unjustified  for a government  to look for privatization schemes that may ensure the 
autonomy and national character of  one or two major banks. One should be aware of and try 
to minimize the risk that the institution privatized without a strong strategic investor will not 
be able withstand competition and will cause problems in the future. 
  
Only strong and sound banks that meet the following conditions may be privatized without 
the participation of a strategic investor. These banks should: 
1) easily meet bank capital adequacy requirements, 
2) be capable of generating profits, 
3) have a management capable of ensuring the future of the institution. 
 
It would be advisable, however, to find a group of core shareholders to exercise ownership 
control  to avoid a situation in which control of the bank falls in the hands of irresponsible 
investors. It is important that the ownership structure after privatization is transparent so that 
the banks have access to capital markets if the need for a capital increase arises. 
  
Banks that do not meet even one of these criteria should be privatized with the participation of 
a strategic investor. 
 
It must be said that these recommendations are not always easy to follow. 
 
4.3. Strengthening of regulatory and institutional framework 
 
Progress with regulations – problem with enforcement 
 
There are significant differences among our six countries in the quality of regulatory and 
supervisory regimes, with Poland and Hungary having the strongest systems and other 
countries lagging behind
48/. There are, however, common problems  that concern all of the 
countries to a lesser or greater extent. 
                                                           
48 / A research on five Eastern European countries  invited to EU accession negotiations underlines that banking 
regulation and supervision in the Czech Republic requires further strengthening. “ Poland and Hungary on the 




Although Central European countries have made  great progress in incorporating the Basle 
Committee’s  “Core Principles”  on banking regulations into their legal systems there are 
problems with the effective enforcement of these principles.  
 
Enforcement is lacking not only because of the shortage of trained staff in banking 
supervision but is also hindered by important flaws in regulations that weaken transparency 
and make the  task of supervisors much more complicated and difficult. These  flaws are 
related to differences between domestic and international accounting and auditing standards 
including lack of overriding “substance over form” and “truth and fairness” rules as well as 
the frequent implementation of regulations on a solo rather than on a consolidated basis. 
 
Accounting and auditing standards 
 
Central European countries made  great progress in bringing their national accounting  and 
auditing standards broadly in  line with International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA). There are, however, still material differences 




A very important weakness of  prudential regulations, reporting and auditing standards in 
Central European countries is the lack  or insufficient level of consolidation requirements. 
This makes it difficult for banking supervision to supervise on  a fully consolidated basis and 
some problems may be swept away by banks into affiliates
49/.  Without  full consolidation not 
only the public and supervisors may be misled but also bank managements may not properly 
understand the risks borne by their institutions.  
 
Application of  “substance over form” 
 
One of the most important failings of accounting regulations in  Central European countries is  
the precedence of the legal form of a transaction over its commercial substance. According to 
Peter Cunningham of Price Waterhouse: “The application of  >> substance over form << is 
one of the most important  tools by which unfair reporting practices can be reduced or even 
eliminated ...”
50/.  This tool is unavailable to auditors in most Central European countries
51/. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
other hand have strong regulatory and supervisory regimes which are broadly in line with those of the EU, with 
Poland deemed to be almost over-regulated.” Flemings Research, “Eastern Europe and the EU: On the fast 




49 / “...the implementation of these regulations on solo rather than a consolidated basis enables banks to bypass 
the spirit whilst operating within the ‘letter of the law’  should they so choose.” FITCH IBCA, “The Czech 
Banking System and Prudential Regulations”, May 1998, p.2 
 
50/ P. Cunningham (Price Waterhouse), “Interpreting the figures: How reliable are there?”, presentation at a 
conference “Bank Credit Risk in Central & Eastern Europe and the CIS”, organized by IBC UK Conferences 
Limited,  sponsored by Moody’s Investor Service, Prague June 30 - July1, 1998.  
 
51 /  Concept of  “substance over form” left out of accounting legislation is usually recognized in tax legislation , 




The introduction of the “substance over form”  rule will become more urgent as transactions 
become more complicated and their economic substance is changed by derivative instruments. 
Presentation of accounts based on the legal form of transactions may often be misleading. In 
these circumstances banking supervisors – who may always have difficulties with catching up 
with innovations in the commercial sector -  would find it difficult to assure adequate 
enforcement of the substance of prudential regulations. 
 
Truth and fairness 
 
Auditing regulations in Central European countries emphasize compliance with regulations 
and do not provide the auditor with an overriding principle of  "truth and fairness" which is 
key in ISA and constitutes an important tool to counter practices which formally comply with 
but are against the spirit of the regulations. 
 
Impact of national accounting standards on transparency of  IAS  accounts  
 
Major banks usually present their annual IAS accounts as well. IAS  accounts are typically 
compiled by auditors based on book records kept according to national standards. Such 
compilation is not only costly and  time consuming but in addition  may not always be of  the 
best quality. Thus differences between national standards and IAS may hinder the 
transparency of banks' IAS financial statements
52/.     
 
Need for international standards  on loan classification and provisioning 
 
There is no international standards on loan classification and provisioning requirements. This 
is an important flaw which diminishes the usefulness of IAS auditors reports. It would be 
advisable if such standards are established (this is a role for BIS and international auditing 
companies). 
 
Monitoring and supervising  foreign indebtedness and currency risk  
of  banks and enterprises 
 
In the medium term, Central  European economies will be exposed to growing risk of excess 
foreign indebtedness and currency mismatches of the commercial sector. Interest rate 
differentiates (with local currency rates in Central European countries higher than in 
international USD and Euro markets) and underestimation of  local currency depreciation risk 
may encourage companies to build dangerous open short foreign exchange positions. This 
may happen both by direct foreign borrowings as well as by taking foreign currency 
denominated loans from local banks.  
 
In order to control these risks:  
                                                           
52 /  An opinion on Czech accounting system can  also be applied to other countries in the region: 
 "The quantifiable differences between Czech accounting principles and IAS  (...) should not impact on the 
presentations of IAS financial statements by banks. However they do have an impact, since the accounting 
records of the bank are primarily set up to provide statutory reporting and not IAS format. This is a legal 
requirement. In setting local rules which closely approximate IAS, management can fairly easily convince most 
counterparties, investors and auditors that the differences are not material, so can be overlooked. I stress that in 
my view the differences can be great and thorough analysis is needed to ascertain the true position of these 




•  Financial authorities should monitor foreign indebtedness of the commercial sector on a 
regular basis and statistical data should be published  on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
 
•  Financial authorities should have the ability to introduce measures
53/ to discourage short-
term capital inflows in case the stock of such inflows  becomes significant in relation to 
foreign reserves. Such  measures are not emergency measures to be introduced in a crisis 
situation. They should be introduced early enough to prevent the build-up of excessive 
stock of volatile inflows and if inflow pressure persists. It  may also be justified to keep 
these measures for  a longer period. 
 
•  Currency risk exposure should be reported in audited financial reports published by all 
companies above a certain size. 
 
•  Guidance (indicative limits) on foreign currency exposures (relating open foreign 
exchange position to  capital) for companies should be established. 
 
•  Companies with short foreign exchange position exceeding limits  should be banned from 
external borrowings. 
 
Strengthening the quality of  banking supervision with more reliance on private sector and 
market 
 
The task to protect the stability of the banking sector creates high requirements for 
supervisors. To create efficient supervisory institutions,  recruit, train and preserve good staff 
is difficult especially in transition economies.  If supervisors try to rely on themselves, their 
task  may  is too extensive  to be fulfilled adequately taking into account their capacities. 
Having problems with recruiting quality staff, banking supervision can not be able to perform 
competent and deep on site inspections frequently enough.  
 
In order to become more effective banking supervision should put as much responsibilities as 
possible on the private sector with market discipline being much more focused: 
 
•  Public disclosure requirements should be strengthened in terms of frequency and content 
of information. All banks should publish quarterly reports with an obligation to have   
financial statements audited every six months.  
•  Responsibilities of auditors should be expanded to include the assessment of observance 
of prudential regulations and the assessment of the quality of risk control systems and 
reporting to supervisory authorities on important irregularities. 
•  Banking supervision should concentrate on developing prudential regulations, reporting 
and disclosure requirements as well as issuing  guidance for auditors, controlling auditors’ 
work through on-site  inspections and dealing vigorously with troubled cases. 
 
If  public disclosure requirements are strengthened and responsibilities of auditors expanded, 
banking supervision's capacity  and efficiency may improve dramatically. 
 
                                                           
53 / For instance obligatory interest-free deposits  for one year of x percent of any foreign borrowings regardless 




4.4. Year 2000 systemic liquidity risk 
 
 
There is a risk of a systemic liquidity crunch in the banking system and the whole economy at 
the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000. The original cause of this risk is a technological 
problem which may endanger the operations of unprepared computer systems once the year 
2000 starts.   However, widespread anxiety about the Year 2000 problem could be more 
damaging  than the technological issue itself.  
 
The widespread build-up of liquidity reserves and emergency cash reserves by banks as well 
as corporate and retail clients as insurance against any problems with settlements and access 
to cash may result in a liquidity crisis at the end 1999 before any problems with computer 
systems occur or even if no significant failures take place at all. 
 
The liquidity crunch may be magnified since in the last period of 1999 and the beginning of 
2000 foreign banks and companies are likely to diminish significantly their exposure limits to 
Central European partners, taking into account  the risk of a liquidity crunch in their domestic 
markets and the perception that in Central European countries the risk of a Year 2000 critical 
business failure may be higher. 
 
In increasing its liquidity reserves, a bank may become less responsive to liquidity limitations 
against which it can never be fully insured. In case of a deep systemic crisis and a banking 
panic it can lose liquidity even if it created reasonable reserves and its computer system did 
not fail. The accumulation of liquidity and cash reserves by banks and their clients to 
minimize risk may be a factor in creating a liquidity crisis in the system. 
 
Banking supervision and central banks should play an important role in counteracting a 
systemic risk related to liquidity.  
 
Banking supervision should be required to verify systems and monitor the status of 
preparations. Banks that have not addressed the Year 2000 problem adequately or do not meet 
minimal solvency and liquidity standards (required by regulations) should be eliminated from 
the  system early enough before the end of 1999. 
 
In order not to provoke a serious liquidity crisis in the banking system, situations in which 
clients cannot withdraw their deposits should be avoided. The central bank should execute all 
necessary transfers to other banks in order to avoid a domino effect of conveying liquidity 
problems onto other banks.  
 
The year 2000 creates a specific systemic risk. It is important that the central bank makes sure 
it is capable of providing for all withdrawals of deposits and settlement of payments. The 
central bank should clearly define its responsibilities and be technically and organizationally 
ready to react. Special cash reserves and emergency contingency plans should be established. 
 
The lack of liquidity support from the central bank can result in a deep liquidity crisis in the 
banking system. This in turn would threaten the solvency of the enterprise sector which can S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector Systemic Risk in Selected Central European Countries”, CASE Reports 1999 
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The implementation of these steps to contain year 2000 systemic liquidity risk may be 
problematic in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia where some major banks do not 
meet solvency and liquidity standards, and in Bulgaria where currency board arrangement 
limits the central bank flexibility. However, there is a need for a clear contingency plan in 
each country.  
  
                                                           
54/ It is worth noting the words of Paul  A. Samuelson:     
„ No banking system with fractional reserves - i.e., none which keeps less than 100 per cent of its deposits in 
cash - can ever turn all its deposits into cash at a moment's notice. So every fractional reserve system would be 
"fair-weather system" if government didn't stand ready to back it up. If panic ever again came, Congress, the 
President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board chariman would all act. They'd say: "If 
the panicky American people all insist on taking their money out of the banks, we'll print as much money as is 
needed to meet the emergency." 
Had this been said and done back in the black days of the earlyt 1930's, history would have been different, Our 
country would have been spared the epidemic of bank failures that created fear and crisis and that almost 
brought the capitalistic system down." 
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The paper is an attempt at a comparative overview of banking sector systemic risk in six 
Central European countries as of the end of 1997 concluding with some policy 
recommendations.  
 
Banking crisis is defined here as a situation where the high share of non performing assets  in 
the banking system threatens the liquidity or solvency  of a significant part of the banking 
sector.  
 
Banking sector systemic  risk  can be defined as the estimated future macroeconomic impact 
of banking sector problems weighted by the probability of  different variants of future events.  
 
The countries covered by the paper  are specific by the fact that in the early 1990's they 
moved from a socialist to a market economy and the legacy of a socialist economy still has an 
important influence on the shape of their banking sectors.  
 
All six countries underwent banking crises in 1990s and spent significant budgetary resources 
to deal with them. Crises have been overcome without system destabilization only in Hungary 
and Poland.  Now, the banking sectors in these two countries are relatively robust although  
small in relation to GDP. In Bulgaria a banking crisis ended with a major destabilization, 
dramatic downsizing of banking assets and  a deep recession. Presently, the banking sector is 
reported to be liquid and solvent and the potential for asset quality deterioration is limited for 
some time. Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have yet to deal with their continuing 
banking crises which still constitute a danger for economic stability and development.  
 
The paper consists of four sections. The first section describes the experience of the  six 
countries in dealing with the legacy of a socialist economy. The second section discusses the 
methodology used in the analysis of systemic bank risk and present Comparison Table with 
risk indicators and author's assessments. The third section describes in more detail the 
situation in the specific countries. The fourth and concluding section describes key challenges 





















1989=100 106,1 113,6 152,3 142,2 95,8 93,2




















Belarus 40,4% 30,9% 30,8% 31,4% 35,3% 37,4%
Romania 37,9% 38,3% 33,8% 35,6% 34,6% 36,0% 35,6%
Czech Rep. 40,2% 34,9% 33,6% 34,1% 33,8% 35,0%
Bulgaria 37,4% 40,5% 35,0% 32,1% 32,7% 30,2% 29,4%
Slovak Rep. 37,9% 35,4% 30,6% 32,2% 30,0% 28,2%
Poland 40,2% 34,0% 32,9% 32,2% 29,2% 27,1%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997















































private sect. share in GDP (1997) [EBRD]
private sect. share in indust. output
(1995) [G. Pohl]
private sect. share in GDP (1997) [EBRD] 50% 75% 75% 65% 60% 75%
private sect. share in indust. output (1995)
[G. Pohl]
7% 93% 65% 60% 12% 83%




















1989=100 65 96 95 117 80 99
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania Slovak Rep.






















Bulgaria 61,1% 65,3% 58,3% 43,5% 34,3% 35,1% 14,2%
Czech Rep. 69,2% 69,7% 71,4% 72,0% 73,4%
Hungary 37,3% 31,8% 26,9% 24,3% 21,6% 19,1% 21,3%
Poland 19,1% 19,1% 18,5% 17,7% 17,1% 18,5% 21,5%
Romania 39,7% 24,5% 15,8% 13,9% 17,2% 18,6% 13,3%
Slovak Rep. 62,6% 48,4% 38,3% 43,6% 56,3%


















Bulgaria 47,6% 54,3% 56,1% 54,7% 50,0% 39,4% 18,0%
Czech Rep. 57,0% 57,6% 59,8% 61,4% 59,5%
Hungary 30,1% 33,9% 34,9% 32,7% 30,1%
Poland 23,2% 22,6% 24,1% 25,2% 25,4% 26,6% 28,5%
Romania 26,4% 18,5% 12,0% 11,3% 15,2% 17,5% 15,6%
Slovak Rep. 54,9% 53,0% 54,0% 57,3% 55,3%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997




















Bulgaria 53,9% 61,6% 63,9% 61,0% 55,4% 44,1% 21,8%
Czech Rep. 62,2% 64,6% 69,9% 72,5% 67,9%
Hungary 39,7% 43,8% 44,9% 42,0% 37,9% 36,9% 37,7%
Poland 30,2% 29,3% 30,6% 30,8% 31,1% 32,6% 34,6%
Romania 33,7% 23,0% 15,3% 14,3% 19,0% 21,3% 18,3%
Slovak Rep 61 6% 59 7% 60 1% 64 4% 62 2%















GDP real growth 2,6% 3,8% 5,2% 7,0% 6,1% 6,9%
Credit real growth 2,6% 0,5% 0,8% 3,4% 14,7% 24,2%
Credit/GDP 19,1% 18,5% 17,7% 17,1% 18,5% 21,5%
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997














GDP real growth -3,1% -0,6% 2,9% 1,5% 1,3% 4,3%
Credit real growth -17,4% -16,1% -7,0% -9,6% -10,5% 16,0%
Credit/GDP 31,8% 26,9% 24,3% 21,6% 19,1% 21,3%
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997





Bulgaria - Main Economic Indicators 
                 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998F
GDP (bln USD)  20,7 7,6 8,6 10,8 9,7 12,9 9,3 10,2 12,0
GDP real growth  -6,5% -11,7% -7,3% -1,5% 1,8% 2,1% -10,9% -6,9% 3,5%
Inflation - CPI (eop)      79,4% 63,9%121,9% 33,1%311,4% 578,3% 9,0%
Unemployment 1,5% 7,0% 13,3% 15,8% 14,2% 11,4% 11,1% 14,0% 12,2%
General government balance/GDP  -1,4% -12,8% -5,2% -10,9% -5,8% -5,6% -10,4% -2,1% -2,0%
Current Account/GDP  -8,3% -1,0% -4,2% -10,2% -0,3% -0,2% 0,2% 4,4% -1,1%
FDI net/GDP  0,0% 0,7% 0,5% 0,4% 1,1% 0,8% 1,5% 4,9% 3,1%
CA, net of FDI/GDP  -8,2% -0,3% -3,7% -9,8% 0,8% 0,6% 1,7% 9,2% 2,0%
Credit real growth      -0,9% -12,1% -24,1% -19,5% -8,8% -62,5% 
Credit/GDP   61,1% 65,3% 58,3% 43,5% 34,3% 35,1% 14,2% 
Deposits/GDP   47,6% 54,3% 56,1% 54,7% 50,0% 39,4% 18,0% 
Currency outside banks/GDP     7,5% 7,3% 6,1% 5,7% 5,4% 4,2% 
M2/GDP   53,9% 61,6% 63,9% 61,0% 55,4% 44,1% 21,8% 
Local currency share in M2  88,0% 66,6% 76,6% 79,7% 67,4% 71,6%     
Gross general government debt/GDP (eop)       140,2%102,4%111,4% 107,7% 82,2%
Gross external debt/GDP  48,0% 149,3% 152,8% 130,6%132,0% 84,8%108,0% 98,6% 87,1%
Debt service/Exports  61,0% 24,0% 20,0% 15,0% 11,0% 15,0% 20,0% 15,0% 16,0%
Short term external debt/GDP   76,1% 104,9% 89,0% 53,4% 6,3% 8,9% 8,6% 9,4%
Short term external debt/Foreign reserves  
(minus gold)    3717,4%1487,1%1235,1%625,3% 72,8% 96,2% 64,3% 47,0%
Industry share in GDP    37,4% 40,5% 35,0% 32,1% 32,7% 30,2% 29,4% 
Official exchange rate (Leva per USD; eop) 3,00 21,81 24,49 32,71 66,02 70,70 487,351776,501674,15
Official exchange rate (Leva per USD; avg) 17,79 23,34 27,59 54,13 67,17 177,891681,88





Czech Republic - Main Economic Indicators 
           
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 19971998F
GDP (bln USD)  32,3 25,4 30,0 34,4 39,7 50,4  56,5 52,0 52,8
GDP real growth  -1,2% -11,5% -3,3% 0,6% 3,2% 6,4%  3,9% 1,0% -2,0%
Inflation - CPI (eop)  18,4% 51,1%12,6%18,8% 9,6% 8,0% 8,6%10,0% 6,8%
Unemployment 0,8% 2,9% 3,1% 3,0% 3,3% 3,0%  3,5% 5,2% 7,0%
General government balance/GDP  1,6% -1,9% -3,1% 0,5% -1,2% -1,8% -1,2% -2,1% -2,4%
Current Account/GDP  -0,8% 3,6% -1,0% 1,5% -2,0% -2,7% -7,6% -6,2% -2,3%
FDI net/GDP      3,3% 1,6% 1,9% 5,0%  2,5% 2,4% 2,7%
CA, net of FDI/GDP      2,3% 3,1% 0,0% 2,3% -5,1% -3,7% 0,4%
Credit real growth          4,0% 9,0%  4,7% 3,0% 
Credit/GDP       69,2%69,7%71,4% 72,0%73,4% 
Deposits/GDP       57,0%57,6%59,8%  61,4%59,5% 
Currency outside banks/GDP         6,2% 7,0%  7,3% 7,2% 
M2/GDP     69,4%62,2%64,6%69,9%  72,5%67,9% 
Local currency share in M2          99,3%94,1%     
Gross general government debt/GDP  19,6% 17,2%22,1%17,9%15,9%15,0% 13,0%15,3%13,0%
Gross external debt/GDP  17,0% 23,9%23,0%22,6%24,2%27,0% 33,1%40,6%43,9%
Debt service/Exports  20,0% 16,0%12,0% 8,0%14,0%11,0% 13,0%20,0%14,0%
Short term external debt/GDP    7,3% 5,9% 5,5% 6,2% 7,9%  9,8%12,6%14,7%
Short term external debt/ 
Foreign reserves (minus gold)    64,5%61,7%41,8%24,6%19,8% 21,1%29,6%33,5%
Industry share in GDP      40,2%34,9%33,6%34,1% 33,8%35,0% 
Official exchange rate  
(Koruny per USD; eop)  28,00 27,80 28,90 29,96 28,05 26,60 27,33 34,64 30,18
Official exchange rate  
(Koruny per USD; avg)  29,50 28,30 29,15 28,79 26,54 27,15 31,70





Hungary - Main Economic Indicators 
           
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998F
GDP (bln USD)  32,9 33,4 37,3 38,6 41,5 44,7 44,8 45,1 47,1
GDP real growth  -3,5% -11,9% -3,1% -0,6% 2,9% 1,5% 1,3% 4,4% 4,6%
Inflation - CPI (eop)  28,9% 35,0% 21,8% 21,1% 21,2% 28,2% 19,8% 18,4% 13,5%
Unemployment 1,9% 7,5% 12,3% 12,1% 10,4% 10,4% 10,5% 10,4% 9,4%
General government balance/GDP  0,90% -2,9% -6,8% -5,5% -8,4% -6,7% -3,1% -4,7% -4,9%
Current Account/GDP  1,2% 1,2% 0,9%-11,0% -9,8% -5,7% -3,8% -2,2% -3,3%
FDI net/GDP  0,0% 4,4% 4,0% 61,0% 2,6% 10,0% 4,4% 3,7% 3,2%
CA, net of FDI/GDP  1,2% 5,6% 4,9% 49,9% -7,1% 4,3% 0,7% 1,5% -0,1%
Credit real growth      -17,4%-16,1% -7,0% -9,6%-10,5% 16,0% 
Credit/GDP   37,3% 31,8% 26,9% 24,3% 21,6% 19,1% 21,3% 
Deposits/GDP   30,1% 33,9% 34,9% 32,7% 30,1%     
Currency outside banks/GDP     9,9% 9,8% 9,0% 7,7% 6,7%   
M2/GDP   39,7% 43,8% 44,9% 42,0% 37,9% 36,9% 37,7% 
Local currency share in M2  87,8% 83,5% 85,7% 81,3% 79,6% 73,4%   
Gross general government debt/GDP  67,6% 79,1% 80,9% 91,1% 81,0% 81,0% 68,0% 63,0% 67,0%
Gross external debt/GDP  64,0% 65,8% 59,1% 59,6% 64,0% 67,1% 65,9% 52,0% 52,1%
Debt service/Exports  40,0% 29,0% 28,0% 35,0% 42,0% 40,0% 36,0% 37,0% 20,0%
Short term external debt/GDP    7,7% 6,0% 5,6% 5,3% 6,1% 7,2% 7,5% 7,5%
Short term external debt/ 
Foreign reserves (minus gold)   102,2% 53,4% 38,3% 32,4% 29,7% 30,1% 42,2% 41,4%
Industry share in GDP    25,1% 23,4% 22,5% 22,1% 23,5%     
Official exchange rate  
(Forint per USD; eop)  61,45 75,62 83,97 100,70110,69139,47 164,93203,50216,05
Official exchange rate  
(Forint per USD; avg)  63,21 74,74 78,99 91,93105,16125,68 152,65186,79
 






Poland - Main Economic Indicators 
              
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998F
GDP (bln USD)  59,0 76,5 84,4 86,0 92,6 118,4 134,5 135,7 148,6
GDP real growth  -11,6% -7,0% 2,6% 3,8% 5,2% 7,0%  6,1% 6,9% 4,8%
Inflation - CPI (eop)  249,3% 60,3% 44,4% 37,6% 29,5% 21,6% 18,5% 13,2% 8,6%
Unemployment 6,3% 11,8% 13,6% 16,4% 16,0% 14,9% 13,2% 10,3% 10,4%
General government balance/GDP  0,7% -6,7% -6,7% -3,1% -3,1% -2,8% -3,3% -3,1% -2,5%
Current Account/GDP  0,9% -2,8% 1,1% -0,7% 2,4% 4,6% -1,0% -3,2% -3,7%
FDI net/GDP  0,2% 0,4% 0,8% 2,0% 2,0% 3,1% 3,3% 2,3% 3,0%
CA, net of FDI/GDP  1,0% -2,4% 1,9% 1,3% 4,4% 7,7%  2,3% -0,9% -0,7%
Credit real growth      2,6% 0,5% 0,8% 3,4% 14,7% 24,2% 
Credit/GDP   19,1% 19,1% 18,5% 17,7% 17,1% 18,5% 21,5% 
Deposits/GDP   23,2% 22,6% 24,1% 25,2% 25,4% 26,6% 28,5% 
Currency outside banks/GDP    5,9% 5,8% 5,7% 5,3% 5,6% 5,9% 5,7% 
M2/GDP   30,2% 29,3% 30,6% 30,8% 31,1% 32,6% 34,6% 
Local currency share in M2  68,6% 75,3% 75,2% 71,2% 71,5% 79,6%     
Gross general government debt/GDP  95,0% 81,0% 85,0% 88,0% 70,0% 58,0% 51,0% 45,5% 47,0%
Gross external debt/GDP  74,0% 64,3% 57,7% 55,8% 49,4% 37,5% 32,3% 31,2% 30,7%
Debt service/Exports  29,0% 19,0% 16,0% 13,0% 15,0% 9,0%  8,0% 7,0% 9,0%
Short term external debt/GDP   4,0% 4,3% 5,0% 2,6% 0,7%  1,0% 1,1% 1,9%
Short term external debt/ 
Foreign reserves (minus gold)   75,4% 94,5% 104,4% 48,1% 8,5%  8,0% 8,0% 11,7%
Industry share in GDP    40,2% 34,0% 32,9% 32,2% 29,2% 27,1%   
Market exchange rate  
(Zloty per USD; eop)  0,95 1,10 1,58 2,13 2,44 2,47 2,88 3,52 3,50
Market exchange rate  
(Zloty per USD; avg)  0,95 1,06 1,36 1,81 2,27 2,43 2,70 3,28
 






Romania - Main Economic Indicators 
             
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998F
GDP (bln USD)  38,2 28,9 19,6 26,4 30,1 35,7 35,5 34,8 41,7
GDP real growth  -5,6% -12,9% -8,8% 1,5% 3,9% 7,0% 4,1% -6,6% -7,3%
Inflation - CPI (eop)  37,7%222,8%199,2% 295,5% 61,7% 27,8% 56,9% 151,4% 40,1%
Unemployment 0,5% 3,0% 8,2% 10,4% 10,9% 9,5% 6,3% 8,9% 10,3%
General government balance/GDP  1,00% 3,3% -4,6% -0,4% -1,9% -2,6% -4,0% -3,6% -5,5%
Current Account/GDP  -8,5% -3,5% -7,7% -4,7% -1,5% -5,0% -7,3% -6,2% -7,9%
FDI net/GDP  0,0% 0,1% 0,4% 0,3% 1,1% 1,2% 0,7% 3,5% 2,8%
CA, net of FDI/GDP  -8,6% -3,4% -7,3% -4,3% -0,4% -3,8% -6,5% -3,6% -4,4%
Credit real growth      -43,8% -34,2% -8,7% 32,0% 12,8% -33,4% 
Credit/GDP   39,7% 24,5% 15,8% 13,9% 17,2% 18,6% 13,3% 
Deposits/GDP   26,4% 18,5% 12,0% 11,3% 15,2% 17,5% 15,6% 
Currency outside banks/GDP    6,6% 5,4% 3,8% 3,3% 4,1% 4,2% 2,9% 
M2/GDP   33,7% 23,0% 15,3% 14,3% 19,0% 21,3% 18,3% 
Local currency share in M2    96,1% 82,1% 71,0% 77,9% 78,3%     
Gross general government debt/GDP  1,0% 9,0% 19,0% 17,0% 14,0% 16,0% 22,0% 25,4% 33,0%
Gross external debt/GDP  3,0% 5,7% 13,7% 14,2% 16,2% 17,1% 21,1% 25,2% 22,6%
Debt service/Exports  0,0% 2,0% 9,0% 6,0% 8,0% 10,0% 11,0% 17,0% 16,0%
Short term external debt/GDP   3,3% 4,5% 3,1% 3,1% 3,2% 3,0% 2,9% 3,0%
Short term external debt/ 
Foreign reserves (minus gold)    155,7%115,0% 90,8% 60,3% 61,9% 57,5% 34,1% 34,7%
Industry share in GDP    37,9% 38,3% 33,8% 35,6% 34,6% 36,0% 35,6% 
Market exchange rate  
(Lei per USD; eop)  34,71 189,00 460,001276,001767,002578,004035,008023,0010950,00
Market exchange rate  
(Lei per USD; avg)  22,43 76,39 307,95 760,051655,092033,283084,227167,94







Slovak Republic - Main Economic Indicators 
            
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998F
GDP (bln USD)      11,8 12,0 13,9 17,3 19,0 19,6 19,1
GDP real growth  -2,5% -14,6% -6,5% -3,7% 4,9% 6,9% 6,6% 6,5% 3,5%
Inflation - CPI (eop)  18,4% 58,3% 9,1%25,1% 11,7% 7,2% 5,4% 6,4% 10,1%
Unemployment 0,8% 4,1% 11,6%12,2% 13,7% 13,1% 11,1% 11,6% 12,0%
General government balance/GDP      -11,9% -7,0% -1,3% 0,2% -1,9% -3,8% -4,0%
Current Account/GDP      1,6% -4,8% 5,2% 2,3% -11,0% -6,9% -10,2%
FDI net/GDP      0,6% 1,2% 1,4% 1,0% 1,2% 0,3% 1,0%
CA, net of FDI/GDP      2,2% -3,7% 6,5% 3,3% -9,8% -6,7% -9,2%
Credit real growth          -19,0% -15,4% 21,5% 37,2% 
Credit/GDP       62,6% 48,4% 38,3% 43,6% 56,3% 
Deposits/GDP       54,9% 53,0% 54,0% 57,3% 55,3% 
Currency outside banks/GDP          6,0% 6,1% 6,8% 6,9% 
M2/GDP       61,6% 59,7% 60,1% 64,4% 62,2% 
Local currency share in M2        88,5% 87,0% 88,9%     
Gross general government debt/GDP    25,0% 24,1%29,0% 28,6% 25,0% 25,3% 26,7% 28,0%
Gross external debt/GDP      22,9%25,4% 28,7% 29,8% 35,2% 45,3% 55,5%
Debt service/Exports      6,0% 8,0% 9,0% 11,0% 12,0% 18,0% 20,0%
Short term external debt/GDP      4,5% 5,3% 7,0% 8,5% 12,3% 19,0% 23,6%
Short term external debt 
/Foreign reserves (minus gold)          92,6% 58,4% 68,7% 112,0% 135,7%
Industry share in GDP      37,9%35,4% 30,6% 32,2% 30,0% 28,2% 
Official exchange rate  
(Koruny per USD; eop)  33,20 31,28 29,57 31,90 34,78 37,00
Official exchange rate 
(Koruny per USD; avg)  30,77 32,05 29,71 30,65 33,62
 
 